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The Dutch Ministry of Agriculture asked LEI, IRMA and Berenschot to evaluate 
different risk management instruments in terms of its initial goal(s), efficacy and 
distortions. At EU.level, the government involvement in agriculture insurance is 
discussed as part of the so called 'Health Check'. 
 In total, 13 risk management instruments in different European countries, 
USA and Canada have been evaluated as well as the role of the governments 
with respect to risk management instruments. 
 Based on the theoretical framework and the evaluation of the cases, rec.
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This report evaluates a number of risk management instruments (RMI), including 
agricultural insurance, available to farmers to protect them against adverse 
events. A theoretical framework is described in order to evaluate any RMI in 
terms of its (initial) goal(s), efficacy and distortions. Subsequently, cases of op.
erational RMIs in different countries (i.e., yield insurance, livestock insurance 
and revenue insurance) are selected for an in.depth analysis. Data on the se.
lected RMIs and other relevant (country) data were collected through question.
naires administered to country experts. Finally, based on the theoretical 
framework and the evaluations of the cases, recommendations for prospective 
RMIs are made. 
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ports evaluating USA and Canadian experiences. Special thanks to Brian 
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AIDA = Agricultural Income Disaster Assistance 
CAP = Common Agricultural Policy 
CAIS = Canadian Agricultural Income Stabilization  
CFIP = Canadian Farm Income Program 
EU = European Union 
ESU = European Size Units 
GDP = Gross Domestic Product 
GRIP = Group Risk Income Protection (in the USA) 
GRIP = Gross Revenue Insurance Plan (in Canada) 
GRP = Group Risk Plan 
HRO = Harvest Revenue Option 
MPCI = Multiple Peril Crop Insurance (in the USA) 
NASS = National Agricultural Statistics Service (in the USA) 
NISA = National Income Stabilization Account 
RMI = Risk Management Instrument 







The Dutch Ministry of Agriculture raised a research question regarding the effi.
cacy and distortions of different risk management instruments in agriculture in 
Europe, the USA and Canada and the government involvement. The reason for 
this research are discussions at EU level to offer national governments the op.
portunity to support weather insurances. These discussions are part of the 




The main goal of this research project is to provide an overview of the risk 
management instruments, as well as the role of governments in risk manage.
ment in agriculture. 
The main research questions are: 
. Summarise different relevant risk management instruments as applied in the 
agricultural sector. This is relevant in terms of real cases and/or proven 
concepts. What is the role of government in these operational risk manage.
ment instruments? Who (government or market) takes the initiatives for con.
structing insurance systems or crisis funds? 
. How do the different systems for risk insurance work from the perspective 
of farmers and government? Is income insurance an effective system to re.
place different yield or revenue insurance systems? Identification of the key 
success (and failure) factors to the efficacy and distortions of these instru.
ments. 
. What role does political and socio.economic context play in the choices gov.
ernments make for different risk management instruments and financial 
support? What are the objectives and perceptions concerning risk manage.
ment instruments of different national governments that are part of this re.
search?  
. What is the influence of resilience of the sector on governments'choices for 





Seven countries and 13 risk management instruments were selected to answer 
the above.mentioned questions.  
 Based on a theoretical framework a questionnaire was developed by the 
Dutch team of researchers. This questionnaire was answered by experts on risk 
management in five European countries (Estonia, Poland, Germany, The Nether.
lands and Spain) and the USA (which answered the questions for both the United 
States and Canada). 
 Project meetings with these experts were used to discuss the findings of 




No clear evidence was found that the political and socio.economic context in 
terms of government attitude, additional ad hoc support by the government, 
continuity of governmental involvement, economic importance of agriculture 
sector in total economy, agricultural employment and relative capital intensive.
ness, strongly influences the current government attitude towards the agricul.
ture sector, nor the government involvement in risk management instruments. 
Also, no clear evidence was found on the relation between the resilience of the 
agriculture sector and the current government involvement in risk management 
instruments. There is a strong indication that the involvement depends strongly 
on the circumstances at the time of the introduction of measures. This implies 
that there is no adaptation of the involvement of governments to changing cir.
cumstances. 
 The selected cases differ greatly with respect to the covered perils, the pol.
icy approach, the coverage basis, the public private partnership, the govern.
mental support and the voluntary or compulsory participation of farmers. For 
crop insurances, a wide spectrum of risk management instruments was consid.
ered in the research. For livestock only two risk management instruments were 
selected which don’t differ much.  
 The Spanish crop insurance for winter cereals is effective from both farmers 
and government perspective. Also the American Group Risk Income Protection 
and Group Risk Plan are both effective from the perspective of these stake.
holders. The Canadian National Income Stabilization Account and Canadian Agri.
cultural Income Stabilization are both effective from a farmer’s perspective but 
not from a government perspective. The Estonia Crop Insurance, which has 
been phased out, was not effective from both perspectives. 
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 Both the compulsory Animal disease funds in Germany and the Netherlands 
are effective from farmers'perspective and government perspective.  
 Almost all risk management instruments studied in this research showed one 
or more distortions. The Dutch Rainfall mutual is prone to adverse selection be.
cause of the small pool and no premium differentiation. 
 Compensations based on loss appraisal may lead to moral hazard behaviour 
if indemnified losses are within control of the farmer. In four cases this could 
play a role however it is difficult to prove the occurrence of moral hazard. 
 Rent seeking and capitalisation of subsidised insurances play a role in most 
of the cases because, in reality, many of the existing risk management instru.
ments are financially supported by the government.  
 Misreporting may be encountered in indemnity.based insurance. For exam.
ple, some farmers may declare larger losses than they really incurred.  
 Governmental support to farmers may create perverse incentives such as 
excessive risk exposure, for example production in marginal, high.risk areas.  
 A final distortion is that government involvement crowds out private initia.
tives.  
 There are ways of minimising all distortions. For example, adverse selection 
can be countered by implementing a mandatory system and rent seeking can be 




- From an economic point of view subsidising insurance is not effective as it 
disturbs markets.  
- In the real world, a long history exists of subsiding agriculture in different 
ways.  
- Within the EU there are different RMI in use for production or yield risks.  
- Within the EU there are no successful RMI to cope with price risks.  
- The existence of instruments today cannot be explained by the current po.
litical context, or by the current resilience of the sector.  
- Instruments that are adopted do not adapt to changes in the context. 
- Within the EU, the direct costs of notifiable diseases are indemnified by EU, 
national governments and in some countries (The Netherlands, Germany) 
also partly by farmers.  
- Participation of farmers to insure the indirect costs of notifiable diseases, 
such as production interruption, is low.  
- The role and involvement of national governments differs between adverse 
weather events and notifiable diseases.  
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 . For adverse weather events, government participation varies from ad.
hoc relief in the case of crises to public.private insurance arrange.
ments.  
 . For notifiable animal diseases, national governments have a role in pre.
vention and eradication. In addition, part or all of farmers'direct losses 
are indemnified by EU and national governments. 
- Most countries express a desire to move away from a system of ad.hoc 
support due to its unpredictability and cost. 
- The overriding trend is that support in the form of agricultural subsidies is 
still considered to be desirable.  
- The efficacy of non.subsidised private insurance instruments is generally low 
for farmers and government mainly because of the low participation of 
farmers (hail and thunderstorms being an exception).  
- Despite other instruments, in periods of crisis, governments often support 
the agricultural sector.  
- Public.private systems of multi.peril insurance are effective for farmers and 
national government but is potentially distorting, and crowds out other pri.
vately developed schemes.  
- In Spain, most deficiencies encountered in publicly provided crop insurance 
have been successfully fought since the mid.1990s at the expense of high 
premium subsidisation. 
- From the point of view of social welfare, none of the schemes reviewed can 
be said to be ‘optimal’. The analysis of distortions show that some arrange.
ments are more societal efficient than others. 




1. The choice for any new system (or the revision of an existing one) is a politi.
cal decision where efficacy, efficiency and distortions (see also table 5.1) 
must be weighed. If subsidies are involved, special attention should be given 
to limiting the potential efficiency losses due to negative distortions. 
2. The government involvement should be focused on the correlated risks prob.
lems and should offer opportunities for private sector insurers to introduce 
products that pay indemnities on individual farm losses (almost uncorrelated 
losses). 
3. An interesting addition to this study would be to evaluate the third major 
stakeholder in risk management: the insurance companies. This was not 
part of the scope of this study, yet getting them involved in this may offer 
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new opportunities and insights. Questions such as: 'What would move the in.
surance companies to offer certain types of insurance?' could be very helpful 
in determining the most appropriate policy whereby the need for RMIs by the 
sector is also taken into account. Actuaries at the major insurers have a 
keen eye for the existing markets, and are able to help determine where the 
largest opportunities are. 
4.  The need for RMI as stated by the sector does not necessarily lead to more 
government involvement. Each government can make its own decision about 
the role it will take. A trend can be seen in the support of subsidies. Subsi.
dising insurance systems does not cover all risks. The risks of large, exten.
sive crises are not insured. It is even the question whether insurance 
companies can insure them. From this, it can be concluded that the agricul.
tural sector needs a last resort. The government should acknowledge and 
anticipate that fact.  
5. The case studies suggest that ad hoc support of national governments will 
continue to be important in times of crises. To the Dutch government the 
recommendation can be made to incorporate ad hoc relief in its policies. 
Furthermore, if the Dutch government wishes to support farmers suffering 
from a crisis by means of an institutional ad hoc relief instrument, this could 
be conditional upon the farmer's participation in private or public.private in.





1.1 Research problem 
 
In agriculture, most available risk management instruments (RMIs) are not en.
tirely market.based; various forms of private.public RMIs such as subsidised in.
surance schemes or income stabilisation schemes are in place to safeguard 
farmers against adverse events. The health check of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) provides opportunities for governments to support risk manage.
ment instruments. Providing safety nets for farmers is one of the underlying ob.
jectives of the health check. The choice which RMIs are best able to achieve this 
objective is a complicated one. Evaluating the efficacy and distortions of RMIs is 
a complex and challenging task. There is a plethora of international studies 
evaluating performance of insurance schemes in agriculture through reporting 
the more or less standard fact sheets. Problems often observed in these stud.
ies relate to the schemes'sustainability and efficiency. In fact, most subsidised 
crop insurance schemes have failed to sustain a positive rate or return (Wright, 
2006). However, many of the published evaluations present only a partial reality 




1.2 Research goal 
 
The goal of this research project is to give an overview of the risk management 
instruments, as well as the role of governments in respect to risk management 
in agriculture. We do this by means of a seven.country case study approach, in 
which we examine a total of 13 RMIs including the case of the direct payments 
under Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union (EU)1. For this 
study, the emphasis will be on market.oriented and various designs of pub.
lic/private instruments, based on risk pooling.  
 Not only does the success or failure of the various RMIs depend to some 
degree on the context in which these must live, but it may reasonably be as.
sumed that their existence does as well. Whether or not an instrument covers a 
                                                 
1 Cases are divided as follows: Canada (2), Estonia (1), EU (1), Germany (1), Netherlands (2), Poland 
(2), Spain (2) and the United States (2). 
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single peril or multiple perils, the degree to which an instrument is subsidised, 
or whether an insurance or a fund is used as an instrument, are all outcomes 
from a process that takes place in each country individually. This process also 
takes place on a larger stage, and several trends may be observed at a global 
level.  
 
Main research questions are: 
- Summarise different relevant operational RMIs as applied in the agricultural 
sector. This is relevant in terms of real cases and/or proven concepts. What 
is the role of government in these operational RMIs? Who (government or 
market) takes the initiatives for constructing insurance systems or crisis 
funds? 
- How do the different systems work for risk insurance from the perspective 
of farmers and government? Is income insurance an effective system to re.
place different yield or revenue insurance systems? Identification of the key 
success (and failure) factors to the efficacy and distortions of these instru.
ments. 
- What role does context (political and socio.economic) play in the choices 
governments make for different RMIs and financial support? What are the ob.
jectives and perceptions concerning RMIs of different national governments 
that are part of this research?  
- What is the influence of resilience of the sector on governments'choices for 
different RMIs and financial support?  
 
 Risk management instruments studied are diverse but commonly aim at 
helping farmers to cope with adverse events. Similarly, efficacy is evaluated 
from the perspective of an instrument being effective in reducing farm.
ers'income fluctuations and shortfall risks. Possible risk management instru.
ments include on.farm instruments, such as diversification, production flexibility 
and information gathering, as well as risk.sharing instruments, such as insur.
ance schemes and futures markets (Hardaker et al., 2004). For this research 
there is a strong focus on private, public and private.public insurance schemes. 
 From the last two research questions it can be deducted that the goal is to 
determine how the two main indicators (context and resilience) influence the ex.
istence of the different RMIs. To examine the context, one must juxtapose the 
arguments and convictions regarding the role of the government against the 
behaviour of agricultural entrepreneurs. On the other hand one must evaluate 
the extent to which government actions and attitudes are influenced by the  
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resilience of the sector, in other words, its capacity for risk absorption. Both 
spheres of influence are examined on a per.country basis in this case study. A 
part of this study is aimed at identifying the factors that drive government’s 
choices for RMIs and their involvement. 
 
 
1.3 Research Method 
 
For this research experts from six countries were selected to do the research. 
The selection of the experts, countries and RMIs was determined by the follow.
ing considerations:  
(a) the need to include different EU member states, both the old and new mem.
ber states, as well as the USA and Canada. 
(b) the need to include countries with different climatic conditions and institu.
tional environments. 
(c) the need to cover RMIs used in different agricultural sectors (i.e. crop and 
livestock). 
(d) the need to consider diverse designs of RMIs, with special focus on different 
forms of public.private partnership. 
 
 Per expert, two cases were selected. The USA team also analysed two 
cases from Canada. In total, 13 cases formed part of this research. The cases 
were selected in such a way that 'comparable' RMIs from different countries 
could be compared. Also RMIs which have been phased out and newly estab.
lished are part of the research. The selection of the cases was carried out dur.
ing the first meeting with all experts. 
 The cases are described by a format developed by the Dutch team.  
 
 The format (see separate appendix) has the following global content: 
. Environmental scan 
 . General description of agriculture, risk attitude and solidarity of farmers 
 . Institutional characteristics 
 . Farm structure 
 . Risk environment 
 . Overall needs and wishes with respect to agriculture 
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. Description of RMI 
 . Situation prior to RMI evaluated 
 . General description of RMI evaluated 
 . Efficacy 
 . Efficiency 
 . Current involvement of the government 
 
 During the second meeting with all the experts, the described RMIs were 
discussed and compared between countries. All the described cases will be 
published in a separate appendix which is available on request. 
 The methods for analysing the cases are described in chapter 2. 
 
 
1.4 Outline report 
 
The report begins by describing the theoretical framework in order to evaluate 
any RMI in terms of its (initial) goal(s), efficacy and distortions. Also the frame.
work analysing the impact of political and socio.economic context and resilience 
of agriculture farms on RMI and government involvement is described in this 
chapter. 
 In chapter 3 the results of the analysis of the impact of political and socio.
economic context and resilience of agriculture farms on RMI and government in.
volvement are presented. 
 Subsequently in chapter 4, cases of operational RMIs in different countries 
(i.e., yield insurance, livestock insurance and revenue insurance) are selected 
for an in.depth analysis. Data on the selected cases of RMIs and other relevant 
(country) data were collected through questionnaires administered to country 
experts. Finally, based on the theoretical framework and the evaluations of the 
cases, recommendations for prospective RMIs are made. 
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2 Theoretical framework 
 
 
2.1 Risk management in an ideal world 
 
Farmers can choose from a variety of risk management instruments. Ideally, 
farmers compose their optimal portfolio of risk management instruments from a 
wide variety of possibilities. Possible risk management instruments include on.
farm instruments, such as diversification, production flexibility and information 
gathering, as well as risk.sharing instruments, such as insurance schemes and 
futures markets (Hardaker et al., 2004). Individual choices are likely to depend 
on risk attitude and farming circumstances. 
 
Benefits for society 
If farmers are able to share (part of) their risk, society may be better off, as dis.
cussed by Arrow (1992), Rejda (1998) and Hardaker et al. (2004), among oth.
ers: 
If two individuals freely enter a contract, then both of them must be better off 
(i.e. there must be an increase in utility for both). The sum of many such con.
tracts makes society better off (unless other individuals are injured in some 
way). 
 The possibility of sharing risk permits individuals to engage in risky activities 
which they would not otherwise undertake. That way, the expected return to so.
ciety is increased over what would prevail if individual agents were constrained 
to accept only those risks they could afford to bear themselves. If farmers can 
trade away part of their risks, so that they can move closer.not fully because 
there are costs involved.to the point of expected profit maximisation, the result 
is a more socially desirable allocation of resources. 
 Trading away risks is likely to result in more stable farmers'incomes. More 
stable incomes are likely to lead to more stable expenditure on farm inputs and 
family consumption, thereby implying more stability for rural businesses with 
possible flow.on benefits for the society as a whole, for example via more rural 
employment. Moreover, it seems likely that more stable farm incomes may con.
tribute to the viability of rural towns since there appears to be a degree of irre.
versibility in the provision of retail and service activities in such communities. A 
downturn in farm incomes and hence in spending by farm families, leads to the 
closure of some local businesses and to the withdrawal of government and 
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commercially.provided services, yet these lost facilities are seldom fully re.
placed when farmers incomes recover later. 
 More stable rural incomes for farmers (and other rural businesses) mean 
more reliable repayment of loans. That should be reflected in improved access 
to credit and/or lower borrowing costs, implying increased productive invest.
ment in the rural sector. 
 If farmers are able to trade away (part of) the disastrous risks they face, the 
resilience (or sustainability) of farms increases, which may mean less human, 
animal and environmental distress after the occurrence of disasters such as se.
vere floods or droughts. This, however, is only true if moral hazard is dealt with 
properly. Otherwise, farmers may, for example, pay less attention to the pre.
vention of disease outbreaks, leading to an increase in the number of disasters 
occurring. Or, farmers may pay less attention to their stock during droughts, 
leading to more . instead of less . animal distress. 
 
No public subsidies 
In a commercial market, design and price of risk management instruments can 
be expected to be actuarially sound. Introducing subsidies, either for farmers to 
lower their premium payments or for private companies to reduce their transac.
tion and reinsurance costs, is likely to bring distortions to the system (e.g., re.
source misallocation, rent seeking, capitalisation, moral hazard and crowding 
out): 
In economics, rent seeking occurs when an individual, organisation or firm 
seeks to make money by manipulating the economic and/or legal environment 
rather than by trade and production of wealth. Typical examples include a farm 
lobby that seeks an insurance subsidy, tariff protection or income support. 
Other examples would be farmers manipulating yields or choice of crop to grow 
to maximise receipts from subsidised yield insurance, or commercial insurers 
off.loading their worst risk to a government reinsurer. 
 One fundamental point meriting consideration is the effect of capitalisation 
(Browne et al., 1992). Almost all farm subsidies thus also premium subsidies, 
tend to get capitalised into asset values (which mainly manifest themselves by 
increased land prices or increased costs to require production rights).  
 Another point is the impact that moral hazard has on the alteration of the 
production plan in order to maximise the subsidy at the expense of the overall 
welfare (i.e., excessive risk exposure). Governmental support to farmers may 
create these perverse incentives. Recent studies suggest that subsidised crop 
insurance encourages production in marginal, high.risk, areas (Wu, 1999). If this 
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is true, subsidies cause losses to become self.perpetuating and society’s 
scarce resources to be misallocated (Barnett, 1999). 
 Governmental support crowds out demand for private sector risk manage.
ment tools (Skees and Barnett, 1999) and/or inhibits the development of inno.
vative new RMIs by commercial insurers. The extent depends both on the level 
of subsidy provided as well as how it is directed. 
 
 
2.2 Risk management in the real world 
 
Market failure 
The theory of market failure is well established. The principal finding of this the.
ory is that, under certain conditions, the production and distribution of a com.
modity through a competitive market in which all the relevant agents are 
pursuing their own self.interest will result in an allocation of that commodity that 
is socially inefficient (see for instance Bator, 1958; Krugman et al., 2006). Two 
areas of market failure that are often related to agricultural insurance are 
asymmetric information and systemic risks. 
 If a pool consists of large numbers of independent risks, the party who pools 
the risk may be able to estimate average losses and so the amount of money 
(e.g. an insurance premium) needed for dealing with these losses. Asymmetric 
information between the risk.sharing parties (such as between insurer and in.
sured), however, can lead to established premiums being insufficient to cover 
the losses (Harrington and Niehaus, 1999). Asymmetric information includes 
moral hazard and adverse selection. In insurance, adverse selection means that 
exposure units most at risk buy more insurance than others but the extent to 
which this happens is not known a priori to the insurer. With moral hazard, in.
sured entities change their behaviour after having bought insurance in a manner 
not predicted by the insurer (e.g. by becoming more careless) (Arrow, 1996). 
 Pooling independent risks reduces the variance of losses. But if systemic 
(i.e. positively correlated) risks are pooled, the variance of losses decreases 
less. In pooling completely systemic risks, variance does not decrease at all 
(Harrington and Niehaus, 1999). Risks that are completely systemic, such as 
prices and interest rates, generally cannot be commercially insured but can be 
efficiently dealt with on exchange markets, e.g. by use of futures. Risks that are 
neither completely independent nor completely systemic, the so.called ‘in.
between risks’, (Skees and Barnett, 1999) are more problematic. Examples in.
clude droughts affecting crop yields over a substantial area and widespread 
epidemics of livestock diseases. Organisations that pool such risks face higher 
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costs of pooling because of the need to hold substantial reserves in case sys.
temic events occur (Doherty, 1997). 
 Asymmetric information and systemic risks in agriculture may prevent the 
emergence of commercial insurance products for significant risks faced by 
farmers. This argument has often been used to support (some modest level of) 
government intervention in establishing agricultural insurance schemes, see for 
instance Arrow (1996). 
 
Institutional environment 
Besides the 'market failure arguments' for some government intervention, 
Georgiadis (2008) argues that current institutional developments further induce 
the need for some sort of government intervention, as discussed below.  
 The institutional environment, within which the financial sector will be obliged 
to operate in the immediate future, is becoming harder. Banks have to work 
within the Basel II framework. Because the changed regulatory environment may 
lead to increased capital requirements for banks, they may react by tightening 
the conditions under which they will offer credit to those farmers who are not 
protected adequately by an insurance safety net. In that case, farmers may face 
more expensive and less accessible credit. A combination of restricted and 
costly credit and no adequate safety net is likely to lead to more bankruptcy. 
Hence, it might be argued that subsidising farm insurance premiums may in.
crease farmers'ability and willingness to be insured which in turn may improve 
their access to credit and reduce the possibility of being declared in default in 
loan servicing and finally bankrupted after a disaster (Georgiadis, 2008). 
 Solvency II is a new regulatory framework within which the insurers will be 
forced to operate by the end of 2012 (at the latest). In this type of regulatory 
framework, insurance products of higher volatility may lead to greater regula.
tory capital requirements and, therefore, they will be less attractive to insurers. 
Thus, an insurer will have an additional reason to consider multiple peril crop in.
surance as less attractive than, for instance, car insurance. Solvency II will con.
tribute to more 'nervous and impatient' markets for high volatility insurance 
products, such as crop insurance. As a consequence, fewer insurers are ex.
pected to write agricultural insurance, and those who do are likely to set higher 
premiums. Premium subsidies can work as a stabilising factor in those markets, 
helping to retain in the market both insurers (by assisting them to build a size.
able agricultural insurance portfolio within which they could more efficiently di.
versify the risk in space and in time) and farmers (by reducing their insurance 
cost). Insured farmers may have easier and less costly access to credit (Geor.
giadis, 2008). 
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 Last but not least, the EU regulatory environment related to state aid pro.
vided on the basis of articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty is changing according to 
the Commission Regulation (EC) No 1857/ 2006 and the 'Community Guidelines 
for State Aid in Agricultural and Forestry Sector 2007.2013'. In article 11 (point 
8) of the above regulation it is stated that 'From 1 January 2010, compensation 
offered must be reduced by 50% unless it is given to farmers who have taken 
out insurance covering at least 50% of the average annual production…and the 
statistically most frequent risks…'. In a number of member states agricultural 
insurance is underdeveloped and most of their farmers have little acquaintance 
with or are not acquainted at all with crop or livestock insurance. Moreover, they 
are discouraged from buying insurance due to the perceived high premium 
rates and low quality services (Georgiadis, 2008). 
 
Government failure 
Despite the above.mentioned arguments in favour of government intervention, 
some (more liberal) economists argue that market failure does not necessarily 
imply that government should attempt to solve market failures, because the 
costs of government failure might be worse than those of the market failure it 
attempts to fix. This failure of government is seen as the result of the inherent 
problems of democracy and other forms of government perceived by this 
school and also of the power of special.interest groups (rent seekers) both in 
the private sector and in the government bureaucracy, see for instance Brunner 
(1976) and Grand (1991). 
 
 
2.3 Combining the two worlds 
 
Policy goals 
In order to evaluate any programme, it is important to consider its (initial) 
goal(s), efficacy and distortions, which are innate to the methods of production, 
or other conditions important to the market. Policy makers should not intermin.
gle possibly compelling market failure arguments for government intervention 
with other goals such as the sustainability of rural communities. Governments 
may well opt for intervention to support farmers for promoting sustainability and 





Focussing on RMIs, previous sections show that there are arguments against 
public subsidies in the 'ideal world' and market failure arguments in favour of 
some sort of government intervention in the 'real world'. So what should gov.
ernments do? In the field of agricultural risk management, there seems to be 
some agreement with regard to the following policy options (Cafiero et al., 
2005; Berg and Kramer, 2008; Cafiero, 2008). 
 With regard to normal on.farm enterprise risk public policy measures can fa.
cilitate the operation of private markets, including insurance as well as other fi.
nancial instruments. Specific measures can include:  
- Education of farmers and extension of personnel in risk management issues, 
particularly in the functioning and the use of derivative markets. 
- Support of the development of private insurance/derivative markets, e.g. in.
dex.based insurance or weather derivatives, without paying premium subsi.
dies. Support may include (i) providing the regulatory institutions and 
informational support; (ii) the development of informational infrastructure 
such as monitoring equipment and databases; (iii) direct participation in the 
market during the starting phase, e.g. by offering options based on weather 
indexes, or by providing public re.insurance; and (iv) other forms of start.up 
support. 
- Support of the development and operation of mutual funds. Public policy 
could provide matching contributions to those of the farmers and set up the 
rules for funds'withdrawals. This can be a viable option to securitise produc.
tion risks in the case of specialty crops or animal diseases. 
 
 With respect to on.farm consequences of crisis risk two options for public 
policy are presented: 
- In the short term, to provide direct damage compensation after the event 
has occurred. In this respect, only damages to farm assets, such as build.
ings, equipment, greenhouses, perennial crop stands and breeding live.
stock, are to be compensated. Also, rules are set at EU level stating the 
conditions under which disaster relief will be granted, i.e. type of event, ex.
tent of losses, and proportion of the loss that is compensated. 
- In the medium and long term, to take preventive actions such as public in.
vestments in protective infrastructure or the support of private actions that 
reduce the extent of damages caused by disastrous events. Preventive ac.
tions can also include measures that aim at establishing viable private mar.
kets for catastrophe insurance, but without providing premium subsidies. 
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 In the aforementioned options for government intervention, asymmetric in.
formation issues are addressed by intervention in the field of education, infra.
structural improvements and improved and more transparent data collection 
and data sharing. With regard to the systemic nature of risks, proposed inter.
ventions are financial. Miranda (1991), Skees (1999a), Skees and Barnett 
(1999) and Miranda and Vedenov (2001) argued that such financial involvement 
from governments should: 
- only apply to catastrophic events; people generally underestimate ‘low.
probability.high.consequence risks'resulting in a too.limited willingness to 
pay.  
- is set up in a very transparent way; ambiguity about the exact involvement of 
public budgets complicates the opportunities for private markets to take 
over (part of) this commitment.  
- is limited in scope and time; private stakeholders, i.e. farmers and insurance 
companies, should have incentives for putting into place appropriate hazard 
management policies. 
- has a 'healthy start' from the beginning; experience shows that once opaque 
and extensive subsidy programs are running it is almost impossible for gov.
ernments to step back. 
 
 Literature argues that any financial involvement of governments in agricul.
tural risk management should be evaluated along these lines. 
 
Criteria for evaluating RMIs 
With respect to the overall efficacy of (public/private) agricultural insurance 
schemes, there obviously can be no single criterion that captures the complete 
information about the achieved effect. (Note that, contrary to efficiency, the fo.
cus of efficacy is the achievement of defined objectives of stakeholders, not the 
resources spent in achieving the desired effects.) Based on criteria of efficacy, 
quantitative indicators can be derived to evaluate a risk management instru.
ment. Commonly, the proportion of insured production (i.e., penetration), pre.
mium subsidies (e.g., measured as a percentage over total premium), and loss 
ratios (i.e., ratio of losses to earned premiums) are reported to compare and 
evaluate insurance schemes. It should be noted however that these criteria still 
provide only a partial analysis since they do not answer questions such as 'who 
benefits from a subsidised insurance scheme?' and 'do farmers need govern.
ment.provided risk protection via insurance?' Additional indicators would clarify 
these matters, such as the effect that insurance has on farm household income 
fluctuations. Also evaluation criteria dealing with potential or observed distor.
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tions from, among others, asymmetric information and rent.seeking behaviour 
would provide additional insights.  
 
 
2.4 Framework for analysing the impact of context on government 
 involvement 
 
For both context and resilience six indicators were generated. For each of these 
twelve indicators, one pivotal hypothesis was designed about how it might influ.
ence the existence of the different RMIs. In table 2.1 an overview of the indica.
tors and their hypotheses is given. 
 
Table 2.1 Indicators for context and resilience and their main hy.
potheses 
Sphere Indicator Hypothesis 
Government attitude The less supportive and more liberal the attitude 
of the government, the lower the involvement of 
the government. 
Economic importance If the agricultural sector is of great economic im.
portance to a country, its government is more 
likely to heavily support (and subsidise) it. 
Employment When a large percentage of the population is 
employed in the agricultural sector, the govern.
ment is likely to support it. 
Labour intensiveness 
vs. capital intensiveness 
In countries where the agricultural sector is very 
capital intensive, it is more susceptible to crises 




In case of a very supportive government attitude 











Additional ad hoc? In case of a very supportive government attitude 
towards agriculture, ad hoc support will be high. 







Size (acres) per farm When farms are larger, need for RMIs by farmers 





The lower the degree of on.farm production di.
versity (i.e. the higher the degree of specialisa.
tion), the greater the need for RMIs. 
Access to capital Limited access to capital leads to increased need 
for RMIs. 
Equity (own funds) When the amount of outstanding loans is high (i.e. 




History of crises The more often crises occur, the more govern.
ment involvement in RMIs. 
 
 The indicators for context sector resilience are not independent. The imme.
diate relation between the indicators and either government involvement or the 
need for RMI was examined first, but because of the interdependency between 
the various indicators, a more extensive model was constructed (see figure 2.1 
and 2.2) to capture the delicate interplay between indicators, and shows 
whether they positively or negatively impact one another.  
 
Figure 2.1 Indicators for context and their relationship 
 
 
 Figures 2.1 and 2.2 provide an overview of the relation between indicators, 
the formulated hypotheses and their assumed influence on government involve.
ment in RMIs. The relations are supposed to be positive or negative, and also 
some indicators may be interrelated. In figure 2.1 the relations for context are 
displayed. 
 In the sphere of 'context', the relationship between indicators is determined 
as follows. Economic importance, employment and capital / labour intensive.
ness influence government attitude, which in turn influences government in.
volvement in the different RMIs. This involvement can take the form of 
continuous involvement and support, or ad hoc support.  
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 In figure 2.2 the relations for resilience are displayed. Two of the hypothe.
ses, regarding degree of organisation and history of crises are supposed to 
have a direct influence on government involvement. The other four, regarding 
size of farm, production diversity, capital access and equity are aimed at the 
need for RMI from the sector perspective. The relationship between sector 
needs and government involvement can be assumed to be positive. That means 
that governments are sensitive to sector needs, but, after all, this is a choice 
that governments make autonomously.  
 
Figure 2.2 Indicators for resilience and their relationship 
 
 
 Subsequently these hypotheses were checked against the data compiled in 
this study by the international experts in each of the seven countries. The coun.
tries were weighed per indicator on a relative scale. The country with the high.
est value was given a rating of 100%; all other countries received a value 
relative to that. The qualitative and quantitative data supporting these indicator 
ratings comes primarily from the research done by the international experts, as 
described in their project sheets. When other sources are used this is men.
tioned explicitly. This holds for example for the indicators 'Economic impor.
tance' and 'Employment'. This data was found in the CIA World Factbook. 
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3 Factors influencing risk management 




Based on the described framework in section 2.4 the findings on the hypothe.
ses are elaborated. 
 Based on the information in the case studies a ranking was developed re.
garding the degree of government involvement. This presents a subjective over.
view of the degree to which governments are involved, as per the information 
provided by the experts in this study. This ranking lists countries from the high.
est degree of government involvement (#1) to the lowest (#7). This ranking is: 
- United States; 
- Canada; 
- Spain; 





 Next, we developed a similar ranking for the need for RMIs from the farm.
ers'perspective. This too was based on the information provided by the experts 
in the case study. Countries are ranked from the greatest farmer need for RMIs 
(#1) to the lowest farmer need for RMIs, and is as follows: 
1. Spain; 
2. The Netherlands; 






 We produced these rankings in order to evaluate the relationship between 




3.1 Political and socio.economic context  
 
Six indicators were evaluated that may greatly influence both the existence and 
the success rate of the various RMIs. As said, these indicators were rated rela.
tive to the country with the highest value. A visual representation of the results 
in the sphere of 'context', both socio.economic and political, is displayed in fig.
ure 3.1 below. 
 
Figure 3.1 Country scores for the indicators of context 
 
 
 These indicators and their hypotheses will be briefly examined below. 
 
3.1.1 Government attitude 
 
Governments in many countries are in favour of supporting agriculture. In table 
3.1 the objectives and perceptions regarding RMI of the national governments 
that are part of this research are elaborated. 



















Table 3.1 Objectives/perceptions regarding RMI 
Country Objectives / perceptions regarding RMI 
Germany Germany has the ambition to create conditions for liberalisation. Na.
tional government does not see it as an objective to support the agricul.
tural sector substantially. In times of crises the continuity of business is 
most important 
Spain In times of crises the sector expects government involvement aimed at 
compensation, but since 2004, the eligibility for compensation is based 
on contracting minimum insurance coverage. Besides that, Spain has an 
extensive insurance system. In a recent debate on March 31, 2008, all 
farmers'organisations, together with government officials and represen.
tatives of the insurance companies, agreed on continuing to work to.
wards achieving more penetration and acceptance of the existing 
insurance system. Spanish government is willing to support the sector 
continuously.  
Estonia Estonia is liberal. A public.private system of subsidised crop insurance 
was launched on 1st of July 2008. 
Poland The policy in Poland is aimed at continuing subsidies. Risk management 
is relatively new in Poland. Recently it was decided to design an obliga.
tory farm production insurance under which part of the insurance pre.
mium is subsidised.  
United States Government support is continuous, also in times of crises. Government 
makes huge financial reservations for this purpose. The objective in the 
United States is to protect farmers against production risks and reduce 
the need for ad hoc support. 
Canada  In Canada the objective is to reduce ad hoc support. The RMIs in this 
study did not succeed in reducing ad hoc payments. One of the expla.
nations is the strategic way in which the sector uses these instruments.  
Netherlands The Netherlands has the ambition to create the optimal conditions for 
liberalisation.  
 
 In May 2008, the Health Check in the European Union, and the new Farm Bill 
receiving overwhelming support by the US Congress proved government drive 
to support once more. Yet at the same time, we also see a trend moving away 
from publicly supported instruments and ad.hoc payments after crises towards 
a system of public.private partnerships. This general attitude of the government 
towards the sector could greatly impact which types of instruments are devel.
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oped. The various countries that are part of our research were ranked on a 
scale ranging from a very national, pro.agriculture, close supportive involvement 
with the sector (high values) to an extremely liberal attitude (low values). The hy.
pothesis is that a more liberal attitude of the government inspires the use of 
more market.based (low or unsubsidised instruments). This was hypothesised 
because it stands to reason that a pro.agriculture attitude of government leads 
to more involvement, and much of this is monetary (in the form of subsidies). 
The hypothesis is proven for the European countries (Estonia, Spain, Poland, the 
Netherlands and Germany); it is disproven, however, by the existence of publicly 
supported programmes in Canada and the US, despite a highly liberal govern.
ment attitude in these countries. 
 
3.1.2 Economic importance 
 
The next indicator that was examined was the relative economic importance of 
the sector. Based on data available from the CIA World Factbook, the countries 
were ranked in terms of the contribution of the agricultural sector to the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of each country. The reasoning for why this would mat.
ter is the hypothesis that if the sector is of great economic importance to a 
country, the government would have more reason to heavily subsidise and sup.
port it, in order to prevent it from collapsing. This hypothesis proves to be rela.
tively accurate in the cases of Poland, Spain, the Netherlands, and Germany. 
However Estonia is a clear example that a relatively high economic importance 
of agriculture does not necessarily mean the government offers more support 




Another major indicator of how important a sector is, is the socio.economic in.
dicator employment. In some countries a far greater percentage of the popula.
tion works in the agriculture sector than others, and it stands to reason that 
employment is important enough for most governments to take that into ac.
count into their decision for certain RMIs. This leads to the hypothesis that, 
when a large percentage of the population is employed in the agricultural sec.
tor, the government is more likely to support it. For example, in Poland farms 
are widely regarded as a form of social security for people who lose their job; 
they can find employment on a farm against low pay but with free boarding. This 
is a safety net that the government actively supports by heavily funding agricul.
ture. However, this is disproven entirely in the United States, where billions of 
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dollars are funnelled into a sector in which only 0.6% of the population is em.
ployed. 
 
3.1.4 Labour intensiveness vs. capital intensiveness 
 
This is a rather complicated indicator. Labour intensiveness is the contribution 
of the sector in terms of employment divided by the economic importance. In 
other words, it is the percentage of the population that works in agriculture 
(3.1.3) divided by the percentage of the GDP that comes from agriculture 
(3.1.2). The idea is that a value smaller than 1 means the sector is extremely 
capital.intensive. On the other hand, the greater this figure, the more labour in.
tensive the sector is in that country. The hypothesis here is that labour.intensive 
farms are more flexible than capital.intensive farms, which is why the need for 
government support in case of a crisis would be higher for the countries with 
more capital intensive farms, and lower for the countries with more labour.
intensive farms. Additionally, more capital.intensive agriculture facilitates innova.
tions in agreements and contracts all along the market chain, which enables 
farmers to externalise part of their risks (Garrido and Bielza 2008, p. 61). Can.
ada and especially the US underwrite this hypothesis, as these are extremely 
capital.intensive agricultural industries, yet the degree of government support in 
RMIs is still quite great. Estonia shows rather high labour intensiveness, and the 
complete lack of government.sponsored RMIs also proves the hypothesis.  
 
3.1.5 Continuity of the government involvement 
 
An indicator that is less easily quantified is the continuity of the involvement of 
the government. In general, one may observe a trend towards a more continu.
ous involvement, not only as a macro trend (for example, in the aforementioned 
EU Health Check), but even in those countries that don’t have very much con.
tinuous involvement right now (like Estonia). Some RMIs are exclusively focused 
on ad.hoc support, but others provide support for more frequent occurrences of 
price crises or yield crises (in other words, events that take place on a some.
what regular basis). Governments that have a pro.agriculture (supportive) atti.
tude can be expected to offer much continuous support. No consistent evidence 
can be found for this in the cases: Spain is a clear example of where the hy.
pothesis is proven (supportive government attitude and great continuous gov.
ernment involvement), and Estonia as well (liberal government attitude and low 
continuous involvement), yet other cases disprove the hypothesis. The most ob.
vious example of this is perhaps Poland, where the supportive government atti.
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tude does not go hand.in.hand with great continuous involvement. For these 
countries it stands to reason that the pro.agriculture attitude of the government 
is expressed in a different form of RMI support: ad.hoc support. 
 
3.1.6 Additional ad.hoc support 
 
This means that one must examine the hypothesis that pro.agriculture and sup.
portive government attitudes lead to a greater amount of ad.hoc crisis support. 
This hypothesis appears to be supported by the case of Poland. But several 
other cases, most notably Estonia and the United States, disprove it. In these 
countries, government attitude is rather liberal, and yet ad.hoc support is great.  
 This leads one to examine another connection, namely that governments 
supporting RMIs that offer more continuous support will be less inclined to give 
additional ad.hoc support in the event of large crises. The data, however, do not 
demonstrate any consistent correlation supporting this either. In Germany, for 
example, continuous involvement of the government correlates with offering 
very little ad.hoc support, yet the US government, which also offers many great 
continuous means of support, just approved almost USD4bn in farmer relief 
funds for weather.related disasters.1 
 
 
3.2 Resilience of the agriculture sector 
 
The second sphere of indicators has to do less with socio.economic and politi.
cal factors than it does with what the sector itself looks like. Seeing as the 
farmers are the other main player (stakeholder) in these RMIs, there is some.
thing to be said for them having an impact on the existence of certain instru.
ments, what form they take, and how well they work. Here another six main 
indicators were ranked on a relative scale, as indicated in figure 3.2 
 The indicators and accompanying hypotheses are discussed in some 
greater detail below. 
                                                 




Figure 3.2 Country scores for the indicators of sector resilience 
 
 
3.2.1 Degree of organisation 
 
Under the degree of organisation of the sector several different phenomena are 
included. Not only are branch organisations included, but also cooperatives and 
membership of other cooperative groups or unions. One must apply a rather 
wide definition because terms like 'cooperation' or 'union' mean very different 
things in different countries. When they are all grouped together, the hypothesis 
is that a higher degree of organisation among farmers makes for a stronger 
lobby, which in turn leads to more government involvement or support.  
Stronger lobby is not the only possible reason for farmers to organise them.
selves. Farmers may organise themselves for increased purchasing or selling 
power. Yet, power is the keyword here, and economies of scale apply to let the 
greater numbers work to the advantage of the individual farmer. It doesn’t mean 
that the power is only used for political means. But it is likely that a greater 
economic force is also one to be reckoned with, from the government’s per.
spective. Looking at the relation between the degree of organisation and the 
need for publicly supported RMIs, we can conclude that countries where farm.


















ers organise themselves, typically receive more government support. The US, 
Canada, and Spain have a high degree of organisation as well as relatively high 
government involvement and support. Germany is the main exception to this, 
since farmers are highly organised (be it for economic or political reasons), yet 
government support is low.  
 
3.2.2 Farm Size  
 
Another variable that says a lot about the resilience of the sector is the relative 
size of farms. In Europe there is a scale that takes into consideration the rela.
tive differences between the nations (European Size Units, or ESUs), but since 
two of the 7 countries in our study are not rated on this scale (US and Canada), 
a more absolute value of acres was taken as an indicator of size. The hypothe.
sis is that the larger the size of a farm, the more entrepreneurial and resilient 
the farmers. Their business.minded attitude means they are more capable of 
finding their own way in managing their risks and therefore means that there is a 
lower need for RMIs and participation in existing RMIs is low. This hypothesis is 
proven in North America and Canada. Here we see the largest farms, a very en.
trepreneurial spirit among farmers and generally low use of the RMIs in place. In 
Spain, on the other hand, farms tend to be rather small. Although participation 
in traditional programmes is quite high, a few new programmes in recent years 
have received very low acceptance (<5% penetration rates). This may be due to 
farm size, cognitive problems or simply that coverage is not demanded.  
 
3.2.3 On.farm production diversity 
 
Increasing more often we see farmers specialising, and the number of mixed 
farms declining (whether it be mixed crops and animal products, or mixed within 
either one of these). There is a clear distinction between North America and 
Northwest Europe on the one hand, where farmers tend to specialise, and the 
Mediterranean and Central and Eastern Europe on the other, where farmers still 
tend to have a great diversity of crops. Of the on.farm risk management instru.
ments, production diversity is most useful in enhancing the resilience of an agri.
cultural enterprise when the risks it faces are frequent, and have great impact 
(Berg and Kramer, 2008). Then the hypothesis is that the need for RMIs would 
be greater in countries with highly specialised production. This hypothesis is, 
however, not supported by the data. As mentioned above, the degree of spe.
cialisation or diversity correlates closely along geographic lines, yet for the exis.
tence of instruments this is much less obviously the case. 
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3.2.4 Access to capital 
 
This indicator describes the ease with which farmers can get additional funds, 
such as loans. This again is something that is very hard to compare between 
countries, if for no other reason than the fact that the economies of the coun.
tries in this study are so dramatically different. Therefore, the subjective percep.
tion of each of the country experts we consulted for this study is used. Aside 
from the fact that more money can be borrowed if risks are lower, the hypothe.
sis is that this measure is important because if it was easy for farmers to ac.
cess additional (external) capital, their need for RMIs would be reduced. The 
data the experts provided does not prove this, however. Estonian farmers have 
low access to capital (primarily due to the lack of collateral), yet they’re per.
fectly able to absorb any major blows to their production themselves, with low 
government involvement.  
 
3.2.5 Equity  
 
Related to the previous indicator, but more quantifiable, is the question of what 
percentage of the capital of farmers consists of borrowed funds, and what 
percentage is their own. Farmers who have large outstanding loans can be ex.
pected to be less able to deal with major catastrophes on their own, so the very 
existence of RMIs should be higher in those places. The data shows that coun.
tries where farmers have low equity (high loans) also have a lot of publicly sup.
ported instruments, such as the Netherlands, Canada, or Spain. And in Estonia 
and Poland, on the other hand, we see that the rather large equity of farmers 
there correlates with the existence of very little public support. In sum, equity 
seems to be a reasonably good indicator of government involvement and the 
degree of subsidisation. 
 
3.2.6 History of crises 
 
The final indicator of resilience is the amount of historical crises. In other words, 
how often does a country have to deal with a given peril? While it’s fair to say 
that crises that occur every other year maybe shouldn’t be considered 'crises', 
but simply 'climate', many of these are covered by RMIs all the same, such as 
drought in Poland. Important to notice here is also the fact that many of these 
crises appear to be happening more and more frequently, in part due to climate 
change. That aside, it does seem extremely likely that the past experiences of a 
country matter a great deal in the selection and success of RMIs, the way they 
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have been shaped, and the involvement of government. This means that a 
greater frequency of crises correlates with a greater number of RMIs and in.
volvement of the government. Clear.cut correlations between the historical oc.
currence of crises or catastrophes and government involvement in RMI are hard 
to find. In most countries, the RMIs seem to fail, at least to some degree, when 
crises or disasters happen. The sequence of events is more or less as follows. 
Programmes do not effectively protect farmers when significant shocks occur. 
Governments then provide additional ad.hoc support. They are then shocked by 
the tremendous cost of this support, and they decide to revamp agricultural 
policies in the hope of reducing cost. Eventually, another disaster follows, and 
the process starts all over again. 
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4 Some case studies of risk management 
 instruments  
 
 
4.1 General description of cases  
 
This section describes in general the cases of the selected RMIs applied in dif.
ferent countries and classifies them according to various characteristics that 
define the design of each RMI. Furthermore, the studied RMIs are described in 
terms of basic indicators of the performance of RMIs such as loss ratio and loss 
adjustment costs. 
 In this study, the choice of cases was determined by the following consid.
erations: (a) the need to include different EU member states, both the old and 
new member states, (b) the need to include countries that cover diverse risks 
(i.e. climatic conditions) and institutional environments, (c) the need of RMIs 
used in different agricultural sectors, and (d) the need to consider diverse de.
signs of RMIs, with special focus on different forms of public.private partnership. 
 Table 4.1 shows that, over the years, a range of RMIs have been used to 
assist farmers in coping with risks related to crop and livestock production sec.
tors. The RMI cases selected for this study (in total 13 RMI cases) include long.
existing RMIs and recently introduced new ones designed to improve on the 
RMIs previously used. Each case is presented along with information to identify 
and analyse the approaches used in different countries. Furthermore, to provide 
a better overview of risk management policy in each country, the table also pro.
vides information on other RMIs, which exist or existed together with the RMI 
case(s) in that country. 
 Table 4.1 illustrates that RMIs may differ by the intended sector (crop and 
livestock), covered perils (single peril and multiple peril), policy approach (com.
modity.based and whole.farm), coverage basis (price, yield, price times yield 
and other losses), partnership (private, public and private.public), type of gov.
ernment support within the RMI (disaster relief, direct payments, excessive loss 
payments, premium subsidy, interest rate subsidy, guaranteeing the loan, con.
tribution to a farm saving account, reinsurance, administrative and operating 
expenses, etc.) and participation choice (voluntary and compulsory). The current 
status of the RMI (in use, phased out, replaced or being reconsidered) is 
deemed to be an initial performance characteristic of the RMI and therefore is 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The two selected RMI cases dealing with livestock production issues refer to 
rather long.existing animal disease funds in the Netherlands and in Germany 
(cases 5 and 7 in table 4.1). Both of them are funded via compulsory levy sys.
tems (specified per type of animal) and involve private.public partnerships where 
the governments provide payments for excessive losses following an outbreak 
of a notifiable disease (such as Classical Swine Fever, Foot and Mouth Disease, 
Avian Influenza, Bluetongue). So far, both schemes have dealt with only direct 
losses that include costs of controlling epidemics at the farm level (e.g., diag.
nosis, screening, culling of infected herds and vaccination). However, in both 
countries changes to the existing schemes are under discussion.  
 In the Netherlands, possible changes might include: (a) sector retention lev.
els, (b) types of losses covered, i.e. to extend coverage to some of the indirect 
loss categories, (c) implementation of levy differentiation within sectors, for in.
stance based on farm location and disease status.  
 Also, in Germany, the issue of indirect costs is attracting attention.  
 Note that for risks of notifiable diseases, commercial business interruption 
insurance schemes are in place in both countries. This means that in both coun.
tries farmers can insure indirect costs, at least in part. In the Netherlands, how.
ever, the insurance coverage provided is rather limited and, furthermore, is only 
available to cattle farmers (Meuwissen, Huirne and Skees, 2003). 
 
Crop sector 
The selected cases of RMI dealing with crop production are more diverse by 
their design than the instruments studied in the livestock sector. They include: 
(a) insurance.type mechanisms (such as multiple peril and single peril crop in.
surance and revenue insurance), (b) subsidised loans, (c) farmer self.insurance 
funds, (d) government.insurer mechanisms, and (e) direct payments under the 
CAP of the EU.  
 The CAP is included in this study as an RMI. The CAP is clearly not an insur.
ance system, but it does affect the security of the income of farms. The CAP 
payments are independent of the current farm performance (decoupled based 
on historical entitlements or other criteria). The payments are fixed to a certain 
level and a farmer expects these payments. Due to the fixed nature of these 
additional payments, the total income of the farmer is (much) more stable than 
without these payments. This does not only affect the level of the farm.
ers'income but it can also affect the farming decisions (choosing a more risky 




Multiple peril insurance 
Multiple peril crop insurance design is represented by the cases of crop insur.
ance for winter cereals in Spain (case 10), Group Risk Plan (GRP) in the USA 
(case 12), crop insurance in Poland (case 9) and crop insurance in Estonia (case 
3). 
 The privately offered crop insurance for winter cereals in Spain (case 10) 
runs on a voluntary basis and the government subsidises insurance premiums. 
This insurance started its history in the early 1910 as hail insurance. Since 
1978 the scheme has evolved to encompass new risks, which was only possi.
ble after a thorough analysis of yield variability at the individual.farm level. Since 
1992, the scheme has existed in its current form where droughts can also be 
insured, based on individual farmers'records. These days, the scheme includes 
3 packages: (a) multiple peril (fire, flood, hailstorm and other exceptional dam.
age), (b) zonal yield (including multiple perils, yield losses based on zonal 
evaluations), (c) individual yield (including multiple perils, yield losses based on 
individual historical yields). For yield insurance, the coverage involves a speci.
fied percentage of the difference between average historical yields and the ac.
tual yields. The past drought in 1995 created a serious risk of system collapse; 
a similar or even worse drought 2005 was much easier to face because of the 
relatively low importance of winter cereal premia in relation to other crops and 
livestock premia which were not affected by the drought. In 1995 the system 
did not have as much diversified portfolio of crops as it has now, i.e. when ce.
reals comprise only a small part (15%) of the total insurance liability. 
 Area.yield insurance, the GRP (case 12), was introduced on a national level 
in the USA in 1994. This private.public scheme is eligible for government rein.
surance, premium subsidy and subsidised administrative and operating ex.
penses. Under this voluntary programme, farmers are indemnified when county.
level yields fall below a certain threshold. County.level data are collected from 
the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) and are largely available dat.
ing to 1956. For the GRP, farmers choose the level of coverage for each crop. 
They select a dollar amount per acre and choose the payout threshold (a certain 
percentage of county yields). Dollar amount per acre can be up to 150% above 
the county average. Expected county yields are reported about 6 months before 
farmers select insurance coverage for the season (Skees, Black, and Barnett, 
1997). GRP indemnity payments are made 6 months after crops are harvested, 
usually in April (RMA, 2008c). In cases where conditions predict very low county 
yields during the planting season, farmers may be able to receive some pay.
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ment as early as September (Baquet and Skees, 1994). If county yields fall be.
low the payout threshold selected by the farmer, indemnities are paid (RMA, 
2008c). Payments are based on the percentage decline below the payout trig.
ger. Thus, higher indemnities are paid in years with very low county.level yields. 
For an example of GRP estimates see Skees, Black, and Barnett (1997). 
 In contrast to the long.existing Spanish and American crop insurance sys.
tems, the cases of crop multiple peril insurance in Poland (case 9) and Estonia 
(case 3) refer to rather recent years. In Poland, subsidised.premium compulsory 
crop insurance was introduced in 2006 and provides 5 packages: from basic 
(hail and spring frost) to complete coverage (hail, spring frost, winter losses, 
excessive rains, storm winds, thunder storm, flood). Farmers can select which 
package to enrol in. This instrument is supposed to replace disaster (drought) 
loans, which are described below. Yet this insurance is also meant to fulfil the 
EU requirements of insuring more than 50% of crop area in order to be allowed 
to subsidise disaster (drought) loans.  
 Subsidised.premium natural calamity insurance was available in Estonia in 
2001.2004 (case 3). Government support on an ad.hoc basis was been pro.
vided until 2006 (table 4.1). Currently, the government has established a pre.
mium.subsidised crop insurance to cover yield risk caused by natural calamities 
(also in line with the EU requirements described in the previous section).  
 
Single peril insurance 
Single peril crop insurance design is represented by the case of rainfall mutual 
insurance in the Netherlands (case 6). This private.public instrument was 
launched in 2004. The government provides a non.proportional reinsurance 
cover. That is that the government reimburses the mutual for the amount of loss 
the mutual suffers over a predetermined aggregate limit. This involvement is, 
however, rather invisible as after the introduction of the insurance there was no 
financial contribution from the government (losses did not trigger the reinsur.
ance contract). This mutual insurance scheme is voluntary. 
 
Revenue insurance 
Revenue insurance design includes the cases of private.public Group Risk In.
come Protection (GRIP) in the USA (case 13) and two private.public revenue in.
surances experimentally designed for potato and strawberries (case 11). These 
RMIs are supposed to guarantee a given level of revenue rather then just pro.
duction to a farmer. 
 The American GRIP (case 13) was introduced in 1999. It was intended to 
protect farmers from unexpected revenue losses (at the county level) due to 
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declines in yields, commodity prices, or a combination of the two. Similar to 
GRP, this voluntary plan is eligible for government reinsurance, premium subsidy 
and subsidised administrative and operating expenses. Revenues are measured 
using expected values for county yields and expected exchange market com.
modity prices measured at the national level. In the same fashion as for the 
GRP, GRIP relies on NASS county.level data to determine expected and final 
county yields (RMA, 2008a). Commodity prices are determined using the Febru.
ary futures price for the commodity in December on the Chicago Board of Trade 
as the price reference level (Paulson and Babcock, 2007; RMA, 2003). Actual 
county.level revenues are determined in September by multiplying final county.
level yields by the harvest price . the futures price for the commodity at the end 
of the harvest month (e.g., the September futures price for the commodity in 
December; RMA, 2008b). Indemnities are paid when revenues are below the 
trigger level (Paulson and Babcock, 2007). Triggers are the same for GRIP as 
for the GRP, 70 to 90%, as is maximum dollar coverage of 150% (RMA, 2008a). 
 
4.1.2 Subsidised loans 
 
The mechanism of subsidised loans is presented in the case of disaster 
(drought) loans introduced in Poland in 1997 (case 8). Under this private.public 
design the government signs agreements with commercial banks which offer 
disaster loans. The government covers the costs of the reduced interest rates 
for credit for investments and for purchase of inputs. It is not clear whether the 
instrument will be used in the future. As mentioned above, the recently intro.
duced crop insurance is supposed to replace these disaster (drought) loans. 
 
4.1.3 Farmer self.insurance fund 
 
Examples of self.insurance funds include the Canadian National Income Stabili.
zation Account (NISA) program (case 1). When introduced in 1991, NISA cov.
ered a small number of field crops, primarily grains and oilseeds; however, with 
a focus on whole.farm production, coverage quickly expanded to include all pri.
mary agricultural commodities, except for products such as dairy, poultry, and 
eggs (Mussell and Martin, 2001; Stokes, Coble, and Dismukes, 2000; Zahniser, 
Young, and Wainio, 2005). The NISA is a special type of farm savings account 
available to producers at local participating financial institutions (Coble, 1995). 
Under this voluntary private.public scheme, farmers and the government con.
tribute to a farm saving account belonging to the farmer. The government 
matches the farmer’s deposits dollar for dollar. The intention of this programme 
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was to provide farmers with incentives to smooth income by depositing savings 
in high revenue years that can be withdrawn when revenues are low. Farmers 
had to participate for at least one year before being able to withdraw funds from 
their NISA accounts. 
 Note that NISA was one of a larger government.supported risk protection 
approach for agriculture in Canada. In 1990, the Gross Revenue Insurance Plan 
(GRIP) was created concurrently with NISA. The Canadian GRIP provided revenue 
insurance on a per acre basis primarily for grain and oilseed crops (Simone and 
Harwood, 1991; Skelton and Turvey, 1994). To enrol in the Canadian GRIP, 
farmers paid insurance premiums subsidised by the government. The pro.
gramme provided commodity support at prices that were above current interna.
tional market prices (Simone and Harwood, 1991). A historical, multi.year 
moving average of commodity prices was used as the reference level. Also, the 
government supported (via subsidised premiums) a traditional crop insurance 
programme, which made payments based on crop yields if any of the covered 
commodities experienced yield declines (i.e. a certain per cent below historical 
farm averages). First established in 1939, this crop insurance programme pro.
vided protection from multiple perils including drought, flood, hail, frost, exces.
sive moisture and pests. Besides these programmes, the government 
subsidised loans to address farmer cash.flow problems in the spring and in the 
fall (to store crops until they could be marketed), with the government paying 
the interest and guaranteeing the loan. Furthermore, in 1998.1999, one more 
component for emergency income support, the Agricultural Income Disaster As.
sistance (AIDA) program, was added. The programme covered all commodities 
grown by producers in Canada. Payments were based on farm gross margin 
(i.e., farm revenues minus operating expenses) and began when the gross mar.
gin fell below a specified percentage of historical levels. The AIDA was a tempo.
rary RMI to supplement the NISA and crop insurance and it was replaced by the 
similar Canadian Farm Income Programme (CFIP), which operated from 2000 to 
2003 (Zahniser, Young, and Wainio, 2005). 
 
4.1.4 Governmental risk insurer 
 
Canadian Agricultural Income Stabilisation (CAIS) program, which replaced NISA 
in 2003 (case 2), is an example of another account.based RMI. Within this 
whole.farm private.public programme, however, the government acts as an in.
surer, compared to farmers'self.insurance within the NISA program. CAIS was 
supposed to address problems associated with the NISA program; these prob.
lems are discussed in the following sections. Unlike NISAs, CAIS arrangement 
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does not allow farmers to receive a direct government payment unless they 
withdraw money in a low revenue year.  
 Coverage in the CAIS programme is based on the amount farmers deposit in 
the CAIS account. Farmers with CAIS select a level of protection, determined by 
a percentage of their reference margins, and deposit that amount in their CAIS 
account, which is held at a participating financial institution. Reference margins 
are calculated by taking a 5.year Olympic moving average (which is an average 
that excludes the highest and lowest value) of the difference between farm 
revenues and expenses such as fertilizer and pesticides. Compared to NISA, 
appropriate CAIS coverage begins in the initial year and does not require farm.
ers to build account balances for several years before they are adequately pro.
tected (Dismukes and Durst, 2006; Zahniser, Young, and Wainio, 2005). 
Payments are triggered when the production margin falls below the reference 
margin in a given year. If farmers experience declines in production margins, 
they can withdraw from their CAIS account, triggering a government payment. If 
farmers do not experience a margin decline, the account funds can be rolled 
over or adjusted to farmers'needs for the following year (Zahniser, Young, and 
Wainio, 2005). The size of government payments to farmers is based upon the 
amount in the farmer’s CIAS account and the size of the loss. Depending on the 
loss size, two CAIS components can be specified: a stabilisation component and 
a disaster assistance component that protect farmers when they experience 
small to moderate and large losses, respectively. 
 In July 2007, Canada announced the replacement of CAIS. In the new agri.
cultural policy in Canada (Growing Forward), the business risk management 
components include AgriInvest . a programme in which farmers and the gov.
ernment contribute to farmer savings accounts for small income declines, in.
tending to make government contributions easier to predict than CAIS and to 
increase farmer flexibility. Other programmes include AgriStability . a pro.
gramme providing support when farmers experience more than 15% declines in 
farm income; AgriRecovery . a natural disaster relief programme that provides 
more rapid response and addresses gaps in previous programmes; and AgriIn.
surance . a programme that expands the traditional crop insurance programme 
to cover more commodities (AAFC, 2008; Canada News Centre, 2007). An em.
phasis for Growing Forward is to increase the simplicity, responsiveness, and 





4.1.5 Direct payments under the CAP of the EU 
 
The intention of the most recent CAP reform, in 2003, was helping farmers 
across all sectors to become more market.oriented and competitive on EU and 
world markets, while receiving reasonable income support (case 4). As for di.
rect payments, the new CAP brought the following innovations: (a) single pay.
ment per holding for EU farmers, independent of production ('decoupling' of 
support in that farmers now receive direct payments as part compensation of 
income losses, but no price support); (b) linking of these payments to compli.
ance with standards relating to the environment, food safety, animal and plant 
health and animal welfare ('cross.compliance'); (c) a reinforced rural develop.
ment policy, with reduction of direct payments to large farms in order to fund 
the new policy ('modulation'); (d) a financial discipline mechanism (placing a ceil.
ing on market support expenditure and direct aid between 2007 and 2013). 
 The reform also includes a revamping of the policy of common organisation 
of markets under the CAP. For more details on different aspects of the latest 
CAP reform, reference is made to the European Commission (2003a) and 
(2003b). 
 
4.1.6 Status of other RMIs 
 
Information on other RMIs that exist or existed in a country in parallel with the 
RMI case(s) indicates that, in general, design of the selected RMI cases should 
not be interpreted as country specific. For example, the design of disaster loans 
in Poland (case 8) is similar to subsidised loans in Canada (table 4.1). At the 
same time, the long.existing crop insurance with subsidised premium is not 
unique to Spain (case 10). Subsidised crop insurance schemes have been in ex.
istence for a long time in Canada and the USA. In those countries it seems that 
these schemes are not fully satisfactory. As can be seen from the table, new in.
struments are being developed to complement or replace them. Furthermore, 
as indicated in table 4.1, most RMI cases were phased out, replaced or are be.
ing reconsidered. This indicates that the majority of the studied RMIs have not 
performed perfectly due to different reasons. The following sections will analyse 
in depth the pros and cons in performance of the selected RMIs and factors af.




4.2 Loss ratios and loss adjustment  
 
Crop sector 
Loss ratios (indemnities paid compared to premiums received, expressed as a 
percentage) fluctuated strongly from year to year depending on the occur.
rences of events, but over several years the total average should be below 
100%. This is necessary for insurance companies, otherwise it is not a viable 
product. 
 In the USA, in the period 2003.2006, loss ratios for GRP various from 184% 
in 2003 to 33% in 2005 (case 12). The RMA (2008d) reports that the total av.
erage loss ratio for GRIP (case 13) between 1999.2006 is 81%. For corn and 
soybeans, two of the primary crops insured by GRIP, loss ratios were 98% and 
43%, respectively.  
 
Table 4.2 Basic performance indicators of the studied risk manage.
ment instruments (Explanation of acronyms is in the text) 
 Loss ratio (%) a) Loss adjustment 
costs b) 
1) Canada: NISA . . 
2) Canada: CAIS . 2 
3) Estonia: Crop Insurance . 2 
4) EU: Direct payments under the CAP . . 
5) Germany: Animal disease fund 
(notifiable diseases) 
100% (balanced over 
time) 
4 
6) Netherlands: Rainfall mutual in the range of 80%.
90%. 
2 
7) Netherlands: Animal health fund 
(notifiable diseases) 
mostly been < 100% 4 
8) Poland: Disaster loans (drought) . 2 
9) Poland: Crop insurance (obligatory) . 2 





11) Spain: Revenue insurance 0% 3 
12) USA: GRP various from 184% in 
2003 till 33% in 2005 
4 
13) USA: GRIP 81% 4 
a) Sources are not clear if administrative and operating costs associated with RMI are included; b) 1 = very high 
and 5 = very low. 
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 In Spain (case 10) accumulated loss ratio (1980.2005) in the MCPI for winter 
arable crops was in 2005, 63%. For the entire insurance system the 2005 
drought increase by 2 percentage points the entire loss ratio of the whole agri.
cultural insurance system (1980.2005). Loss ratio was 0 for the revenue insur.
ance (case 11) due to the short history with the potato scheme (only 2 years). In 
that period no indemnities occurred. 
 In the Netherlands (case 6) for rainfall mutual official loss ratios are not pub.
licly available but are in the range of 80%.90%. Since it is a mutual, there is no 
margin for profit. In addition, the government provides a reinsurance cover (not 
for free but with a low reinsurance premium) and the system operates via as.
sessment premiums.  
 For most of the weather insurance schemes (cases 3,6,8,9) loss adjustment 
is relatively expensive. The reasons for this are the high costs of expert com.
missions visiting or monitoring the losses on each farm or in every county 
(cases 3,8,9). Besides, this loss adjustment is relatively expensive since crops 
can recuperate after the adverse event has taken place and therefore need ex.
tensive monitoring (on average 1,500 Euro per reported claim) (case 6). 
 In Spain (case 10) Agroseguro (which is the pooling agency of all agricultural 
insurance companies, and in charge of running the service of loss adjustment) 
realises a significant reduction in administration costs. Ratio of running costs 
over total liability showed decreases of 0.3% in 1993, to 0.25% in 2005. Farm.
ers claiming a loss will receive the indemnity within 2 months from the date of 
notification. Loss adjustment, claim and final resolution are made within this pe.
riod. In the case of revenue insurance (case 11) in Spain in the strawberries 
sector loss adjustment costs were non.negligible, as records of the insurers had 
to be thoroughly checked to evaluate potential indemnities. In the case of the 
potato sector, loss adjustment was not needed as the evaluation of the index 
scheme was performed by University researchers at a cost of 6,000 € a year 
in total. Since it was an ‘index'scheme, its complexity made it quite difficult to 
be understood by growers. 
 In the GRP (case 12) farmers purchasing insurance have to provide less in.
formation to insurers  . limited to the number of acres planted for each crop for 
which the farmer purchases coverage. Also, indemnity payouts are made auto.
matically and do not require farmers to provide evidence of loss (RMA, 2008c). 





In the German livestock fund (case 5) indemnifications and contributions to the 
fund are balanced over time. This is done separately for the different livestock 
species. In the Dutch livestock fund (case 7) loss ratios have mostly been < 
100% considered per 5.year period. Exceptions are the years with outbreak of 
epidemic diseases: 1997/98 situation due to classical swine fever (pigs), the 
2003 case of Avian Influenza (poultry) and the 2007 case due to Bluetongue 
(sheep/goats). 
 In both funds (cases 5,7) loss adjustment costs are low since all animals 
that are culled by order or that die from the infection have to be registered 
anyway. In the Netherlands each herd only needs to be assessed once . al.
though it requires two people to carry out the assessment (one veterinarian and 




4.3 Efficacy from farmers and government perspective 
 
This section describes the efficacy of RMIs from farmers and government per.
spective and classifies them according to various characteristics (table 4.3). 
Efficacy, which is the ability to produce a desired amount of the desired effect 
or success in achieving a given goal, is used in the current study in a qualitative 
and quantitative way. In general, efficacy in this study is evaluated from the per.
spective of an instrument being effective in reducing farmers'income fluctua.
tions and shortfall risks. 
 Our classification of efficacy from farmers'perspectives is based on data 
and knowledge provided by international experts participating in this project 
(see section 1.3) on: premium rates in relation to insured risk, possibilities for 
premium differentiation (more differentiation is attractive for farmers), level of 
deductibles (high level of deductibles means less indemnity payments), degree 
of participation (insured number of farms or insured value in relation to total 
number of farms or total worth of production). 
 The classification of efficacy from a government perspective is also based 
on knowledge and data from international experts participating in this project. 
Experts evaluated whether the RMI achieved a given goal stated by the govern.
ment. In this way ad hoc payments could be effective in achieving a given goal. 
In their evaluation they took into account: the stability of the instrument (not al.
tered frequently), level of participation, number of insurance companies as an 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Insurance for natural calamities Estonia 
The subsidised premium of crop insurance schemes in Estonia were mostly in.
significant and not effective and, therefore, no longer exist because of too small 
numbers of policyholders (case 3). The main reason from the perspective of the 
farmers, was the small basis. The majority of crops are not insured and the 
level of participation was low. Total insured amount in 2003 was 65,000 euro 
with approximately 117 policyholders (mainly livestock farms). The insured area 
was about 1,800ha comprising 0.4% of the total worth of outdoor production. 
Farmers are not willing to buy the insurance mainly because they do not con.
sider the insurance as being an indispensable expense. In some years even the 
insured farms did not receive insurance indemnity, although they were con.
fronted with eligible losses. 
 The efficacy from a government perspective was low, while government pro.
vided support with ad.hoc payments. Governmental support helped farmers to 
survive after the unfavourable 1998, 2002, 2004 and 2005 years. As a wide 
number of farmers declared the losses in large areas, their losses were cov.
ered by the government support scheme. On the one hand, the governmental 
support could be an alternative if insurance schemes do not work, but, on the 
other hand, government support prejudices the market performance for real in.
surance. 
 
Rainfall mutual Netherlands 
In the Netherlands the willingness to buy commercial coverage against rainfall is 
very limited (case 6). The deductible is a high percentage, 15% or 25% of the 
insured amount per crop (in comparison to a percentage of the loss incurred 
which Dutch hail insurers apply). Additional premium payments were necessary 
in order to cover the net retention of the mutual. The level of participation is 
low. The insured area is about 40,000ha comprising 3.6% of the total worth of 
outdoor production. Premium rates consist of a fixed percentage of the insured 
amount that does not differ between, for example, regions. Farmers perceive 
probabilities of losses to be relatively low. Without public support, only a spe.
cific group of farmers would be interested. It should be noted that the influence 
of farming organisations on policy decisions has decreased over the past dec.
ades.  
 From a government perspective, the scheme is developed as a calamity 
cover, so to prevent bankruptcy of farmers as a result of excessive rain. The 
scheme is effective when focusing on the insured farms since they were indem.
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nified numerous times, preventing large losses (although a high deductible had 
to be accounted for). Despite indemnification, the level of participation of farm.
ers is low. The Dutch government role lies in the field of reinsurance, the crea.
tion of the appropriate preconditions, to allow the market to do its work 
(independent information, certification, striving for harmonisation within the EU 
and preferably even the WTO), and the promotion of knowledge and awareness 
among farmers regarding risks and risk management through education and in.
formation. 
 
Disaster loans Poland 
The value of real benefits for farmers from the public drought loans in Poland is 
small and not effective (case 8). More important is easy access to bank loans. 
The support received by farmers is a difference between the interest rate paid 
for credit and commercial interest rates (approximately 1,2.1.5%.points). Nor.
mally the majority of farmers, who are eligible, participate. Participation differs 
every year depending on a scale of disasters and number of applications made 
by farmers. In the most critical year (2006) about 900 thousand farmers (50% 
of the total number) applied for disaster credits. The general level of satisfaction 
is rather low, especially if losses are high. In the case of smaller scale losses 
(yield reduction), real benefits for farmers are low, and administration costs are 
very high, mainly related to loss assessment. 
 
Crop insurance Poland 
Efficacy of the public private obligatory crop insurance for farmers in Poland is 
doubtful because of high premium rates, especially for more severe sources of 
risk (drought, spring frosts) and high deductible amounting to 50% of losses 
(case 9). Basically, in subsidised schemes, the responsibility of the insurer 
starts if losses exceed 30% of yield reduction and 20% is own participation 
covered by insured farmer. The responsibility of the insurer in a commercial 
scheme (without subsidies, at approximate double premium) starts at the level 
of 8% of yield reduction, but participation is limited. The premium rates vary, 
depending on the crop, risks covered and the region of the country. Due to the 
introduction in 2006, less information is available about participation. However, 
participation rates were low in the first year, this is despite the fact that this is 
an obligatory insurance of all crops against major disasters. The penalty fee for 
farmers who do not purchase insurance are .€2 per hectare. A survey, although 
not representative, shows that only about 25% of farmers are interested in pur.
chasing insurance. At this moment it is too early for a solid evaluation. 
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Crop insurance winter cereals Spain 
Only in Spain is the private public crop insurance for winter cereals effective 
with respect to farmers and government (case 10). Farmers satisfaction rating 
is 3.5 on a scale of 1.5. The instrument is quite effective in dealing with idiosyn.
cratic, i.e. non.correlated, risks and systemic risks because of the ability to pool 
risks and provide farmers'indemnities, under the logic of actuarial soundness 
and techniques. With respect to deductible, farmers have different options 
which vary from no deductible to 35% in relation with the level of coverage. 
Over the past years, the participation rates have ranged between 70 and 75% 
of the eligible production and surface, due to high subsidies from national and 
regional government (€470m in 2005 for all crops and livestock). Farmers of.
ten switch from one type of coverage to the other. Farmers claiming a loss will 
receive the indemnity within 2 months from the date of notification. 
 
Revenue insurance Spain 
For the efficacy of the revenue insurance in Spain, we have to distinguish the 
scheme for potato growers and the scheme for strawberry growers (case 11). 
 The scheme for potato growers was quite effective. The scheme was only 
experimentally available for late potato growers of 5 provinces. The participa.
tion was 5% of eligible production in 2003 and 3% in 2004. Losses are fully 
compensated (no deductible). Further work by Aguado and Garrido (2007), 
Bielza et al (2007a; 2007b) showed that basis risk was non.negligible and that a 
stabilisation fund could be a better instrument to ensure similar levels of price 
floor. Insurers never showed full acceptance, but ultimately they did offer it 
commercially. 
 to the fact that Amsterdam future contracts ceased to be traded in 2006, 
so a similar scheme could never have been simulated. The main flaws were: 
. Prices follow a 3.year or 4.year cycle, enabling farmers to exploit adverse 
selection rents. 
. The selection of varieties and models'differential coefficients could be im.
proved. 
. Premium calculation was sensitive to key assumptions, such as length of 
data series. 
 
 The scheme for strawberry growers was never introduced, but had a very 
attractive design. It was made in full compliance with ENESA (Agricultural Span.
ish Risk Management Agency) and the growers'association and firms, but re.
quired some administrative work to be contracted, monitored and supervised. 
Various deductible levels were evaluated (no deductible to 30%). 
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 NISA Canada 
The NISA in Canada was intended to smooth income over time (case 1). Experi.
ence with NISA showed farmers tended to either maintain very low balances in 
their NISA accounts . using them for supplemental annual income, or very large 
balances that they failed to withdraw in years of shortfalls . using them, instead, 
as retirement accounts. Thus, NISA was not effectively protecting farmers, and 
when producers faced low revenues in 1998 and 1999, and producers lobbied 
policymakers for more support, the government provided emergency assis.
tance. This can reduce farmer incentives to utilise income stabilisation account.
ants for risk management purposes (Dismukes and Durst, 2006). 
 By 2000, 80% of eligible farmers participated . over half of all Canadian 
farmers, and was well.liked by most farmers (Dismukes and Durst, 2006; Ipsos 
Reid, 2001). Researchers also note that farmers with large farms are the most 
likely to participate in NISA (Chen and Meilke, 1996; Dismukes and Durst, 2006; 
Edelman, 2000). In 2001, roughly 33% of small farms . farms with sales re.
ceipts totalling less than CAD10,000 . participated in NISA; 57% of medium and 
large farms . farms with sales receipts over CAD10,000 . participated (Dis.
mukes and Durst, 2006). Additionally, most NISA support goes to larger, wealth.
ier farms (Chen and Meilke, 1996). 
 
 CAIS Canada 
Policymakers in Canada structured CAIS to address problems associated with 
the NISA programme (Dismukes and Durst, 2006). For example, appropriate 
CAIS coverage begins in the initial year and does not require farmers to build 
account balances for several years before they are adequately protected (Dis.
mukes and Durst, 2006). 
 Initial evaluations of the programme seem positive, but some concerns exist 
that CAIS may be too complicated (Dismukes and Durst, 2006). The structure of 
CAIS (case 2) reduces incentives to use the income stabilisation account for re.
tirement savings, but even with its generous disaster component, farmers and 
policymakers deemed it inadequate to protect producers during very low reve.
nue years. 
 Also, income stabilisation account programmes are likely most suitable for 
large farms that realise large surpluses in some years (Dismukes and Durst, 
2006). Households with small to medium.sized farms often rely on off.farm la.
bour for their primary source of income and, thus, are less affected by reduced 
farm revenues. For relatively poor households that rely on farming as their pri.
mary income, the high opportunity costs associated with holding large savings 
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accounts may prevent them from participating in income stabilisation pro.
grammes. In July 2007, Canada announced that it would replace CAIS. 
 
GRP USA 
Overall, the experience with the GRP in the USA has been positive (case 12). 
GRP has been an effective programme for insuring farmer yield risk and has had 
the potential to be used in a broader context, such as with wrap.around prod.
ucts (Skees et al., 1997). Farmers choose the level of coverage for each crop. 
They select a dollar amount per acre and choose the payout threshold (70, 75, 
80, 85, or 90% of county yields, RMA, 2008c). From 1994 to 2006, the num.
ber of GRP policies roughly doubled to 21,677 policies sold. At the same time 
the net acres insured increased twentyfold to 33.86m acres. In 2006, the GRP 
insured roughly 2% (USD1bn) of the total liabilities of the Federal Crop Insurance 
Programme (USD1bn; RMA 2008b). 
 The RMA (2008c) reports the desire to continue to expand the GRP to new 
crops and new regions to meet farmer demand. Limitations to expanding the 
programme primarily relate to the need for more NASS county.level data  . 
longer time.series data, more data on minor crops, and data for more regions 
(Skees, 1993). 
 The GRP provides farmers incentives to manage risk to maximise farm pro.
duction. Unlike Multi Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI), whose coverage is based on 
farm.level losses, farmers with the GRP can work to reduce the amount of 
losses they are likely to incur without reducing the size of the insurance payout 
they will receive. Thus, the GRP coverage provides more incentives for effective 
risk management than MPCI (Baquet and Skees, 1994). The GRP improves the 
amount of coverage farmers can purchase. 
Larger farms became more and more likely to purchase the GRP. This finding is 
not surprising, as large farms are likely to have plots in more than one area in 
the county so that their risk would likely be more highly correlated with county.
level yields.  
 The primary limitation of the GRP is basis risk . the possibility that a mis.
match will occur between a farmer’s loss and county.yield levels. For example, 
farmers could experience a loss without receiving an indemnity because there 
was no loss at the county level. 
 
GRIP USA 
The experience with the GRIP in the USA has been positive (case 13). There has 
been a high level of penetration due to the subsidised premiums. By 2005, GRIP 
was available in all counties offering GRP for corn and soybeans and was ex.
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panded to include grain sorghum (RMA, 2008a). In 2006, GRIP also covered 
cotton and wheat (RMA, 2008a). In 2006, GRIP covered 11.7m acres (Paulson 
and Babcock, 2007). GRIP has grown exponentially. For example, in 2003, GRIP 
insured 2% of corn in Illinois; by 2006, GRIP insured 37%. Paulson and Babcock 
(2007) note the increasing use of GRIP corresponds with the introduction of the 
Harvest Revenue Option (HRO), as the acreage insured by GRIP doubled in 
2004, doubled again in 2005, and doubled again in 2006. GRIP has an average 
premium subsidy of 55% of total premiums (Paulson and Babcock, 2007). From 
1999 to 2006, the number of policies sold increased fiftyfold to 51,000 poli.
cies sold.  
 Policies have been consistently sold to relatively smaller farms. While the 
price of GRIP has roughly doubled per acre from 1999 to 2006, subsidies per 
acre increased tenfold. While the structure of GRIP reduces administrative costs 
when compared to MPCI, its coverage of yield and price risks has led to increas.
ing premium rates. Indemnities are paid when revenues are below the trigger 
level (Paulson and Babcock, 2007). Triggers are the same for GRIP as for the 
GRP (70 to 90%). 
 Several researchers have made recent suggestions to improve the effec.
tiveness and reduce costs of the USA agricultural risk management policy. First, 
Paulson and Babcock (2007) note the increasing subsidy per acre cost of GRIP 
and that the introduction of HRO in 2004 coincides with significant increases in 
subsidy. They also report that private insurers, not farmers or the government, 
are capturing many of the profits associated with GRIP. Paulson and Babcock 
(2007) demonstrate that a nationalised insurance programme, one that no 
longer offered subsidies to private.sector insurers, could provide an insurance 
product similar to that of the 1999.2003 GRIP product with better coverage 
(98%) for comparable government support.  
 Coble and Barnett (2008) also suggest the possibility of providing a national.
ised GRIP.style insurance product that expands on suggestions from Skees et 
al. (1997) regarding GRP. Coble and Barnett (2008) argue that if the govern.
ment could assist farmers by addressing correlated risk through an area reve.
nue programme, opportunities exist for private insurers to sell wrap.around 
products for independent risks such as hail or fire. They demonstrate that an 
area revenue insurance product addresses the reinsurance problem more effec.
tively than the current combination of premium subsidies, risk sharing subsidies, 
and administrative and operating subsidies that the government currently pro.
vides, showing that this type of wrap.around arrangement lowers the loss cost 
of insurance products based on individual farm losses. 
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 Despite the introduction of the GRP and GRIP, government expenditures for 





Animal health fund Netherlands 
The Dutch livestock fund for notifiable diseases can be regarded as being effec.
tive for infected farms and not effective for non.infected farms (case 7). For in.
fected farms, the public scheme is effective, as all killed animals are fully 
compensated (no deductible). The scheme is compulsory for all registered ani.
mals. Dead animals are not compensated at all, while sick animals are only 
compensated by 50%. Levies are specified per livestock sector. There is no fur.
ther differentiation within sectors. 
 For non.infected farms the scheme is not effective, i.e. farms with vacci.
nated herds, farms in restricted areas and farms facing losses due to e.g. ex.
port bans, do not receive any compensation from the fund (except for the costs 
of vaccinating the animals). 
 
Animal disease fund Germany 
Also the German system, that is basically similar to the Dutch system, is effec.
tive in its domain, not at least due to the fact that it is mandatory for all live.
stock enterprises (case 5). Premiums differ between species and federal states. 
 For infected farms only the actual value of animals is covered. This value is 
assessed by the 'district veterinary officer' and it is limited by the maximum de.
cided by the Animal Disease Act at a national level. In general, the assessed 
values are considerably lower than the maximum and there is no deductible or 
coinsurance. Animals that have been dead or culled before notification of the 
disease are only indemnified by 50%. The assessed value has to take into ac.
count the market value on the day of order of the culling or values used by the 
EU for buying animals out of the market if the regional markets have broken 
down during the epidemic. Thus, the indemnification for later infections of one 
epidemic outbreak may be smaller than the compensation for the first infected 
farms due to price changes on the market. This avoids incentives for farmers of 
infecting their own herd if market prices decrease considerably after the first 
outbreak of an epidemic. 
 Costs for losses on healthy farms in restriction zones are not covered. 
 The commercial insurance in Germany which covers indirect costs is less ef.
fective. However losses due to business interruption are gaining importance. 
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Distortions of the investigated RMIs are categorised in terms of information 
asymmetries and other distortions causing welfare losses. As explained in the 
theoretical framework section, asymmetric information manifests itself as moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems. A commercial insurance scheme with 
severe distortions is unlikely to be viable if these problems cannot be dealt with 
(at acceptable costs). However, it is not something that policy makers need to 
worry about if the insurer is out of pocket. Nor should the policymaker worry if 
farmers change their behaviour in response to commercial insurance or other 
risk.sharing products.  
 From the point of view of this report, distortions are only important if they 
are too difficult for commercial insurers to deal with, meaning that a commercial 
product will therefore not emerge. Moreover, the story is very different when 
subsidies are provided since any subsidy is distorting, but some more than oth.
ers. 
 
4.4.1 Adverse selection 
 
The most rigid underwriting approach to eliminate the problems of adverse se.
lection entirely is a mandatory insurance or levy system. An example is the 
Dutch animal health fund for notifiable diseases (case 7) in which all farms with 
registered animals must pay compulsory levies. This also holds for animal dis.
ease funds for notifiable diseases in Germany (case 5). Both schemes provide a 
coverage of the value of destroyed animals. Also, the recently introduced subsi.
dised crop insurance scheme in Poland (case 9) is an obligatory insurance 
scheme. In this scheme the farmers who do not purchase insurance have to pay 
a penalty fee (€2 per hectare). However, this penalty fee is rather low com.
pared with the production value and the majority of the farmers opted out. The 
primary reason why many farmers did not participate in the programme is that it 
is viewed as too expensive. In addition, many farmers expect that the govern.
ment will help them, as in the past, with any major disasters. Also, some farm.
ers were simply unaware of the new programme. Therefore, in this case, the 
problem of adverse selection still remains a concern as with other voluntary in.
surance schemes. 
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 The dilemma of adverse selection is also not relevant for the drought disas.
ter loans in Poland (case 8). The improvement of new credit lines for farms af.
fected by drought (or other disasters such as hail, frost) occurs after the event 
has taken place. Needless to say, all farmers are entitled to receive direct pay.
ments as regulated in the CAP (case 4), i.e. adverse selection is not an issue. 
This is especially the case in more simplified systems in which the payments are 
based on a flat.rate system instead of historical entitlements. Although the pay.
ments were originally introduced as a compensation for price decreases, they 
are now considered to provide farmers a certain level of financial security 
(Fisher Boel, 2008) 
 Under the Estonian ad.hoc governmental support scheme (see table 4.1) 
farmers had to declare their losses; then each year the government decided on 
an individual basis how, how much, to whom, and on which extent the losses will 
covered. Also, with this ad.hoc disaster scheme there is no inherent adverse se.
lection. There was no certainty from the farmers' side whether or not they may 
expect the compensation, and on which basis the compensation will be decided. 
This was sometimes also dependent on the activity of farmers'organisations . 
how effectively they negotiated and shared the information.  
 Adverse selection has emerged after several years operating with the in.
come stabilisation instruments NISA (case 1) and CAIS (case 2). These pro.
grammes are likely most suitable for large farms that realise large surpluses in 
some years (Dismukes and Durst, 2006). Households with small to medium.
sized farms often rely on off.farm labour for their primary source of income and, 
thus, are less affected by reduced farm revenues. For relatively poor house.
holds that rely on farming as their primary income, the high opportunity costs 
associated with holding large savings accounts may prevent them from partici.
pating in income stabilisation programmes. Thus, describing programmes such 
as NISA and CAIS as 'safety net' programmes for farmers with small to medium.
sized farms is somewhat misleading. 
 Given the exceptions described above, underwriting is important aspect to 
control adverse selection in a voluntary insurance contract. Insurers generally 
impose an obligation of disclosure in the insurance contract, requiring the in.
sured to provide information about any factors that may lead to above normal 
risk. If the insured fails to disclose relevant facts, the contract can be invali.
dated. Based on such information, insureds are classified and premiums are dif.
ferentiated for different classes of risk (Rejda, 1998). When adverse selection is 
known to be present, and insurers do not have the information to differentiate 
insureds according to their risk exposure, they will usually set higher premiums. 
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 The level of adverse selection differs between the voluntary risk manage.
ment tools under investigation. Probably most prone to adverse selection is the 
Dutch rainfall mutual (case 6) because there is definitely substantial adverse se.
lection in such small pools, and this is magnified if premium differentiation is ab.
sent. Moreover, a substantial part of the pool consists of insureds who incurred 
severe losses in 2002 and had to participate for five years in order to receive 
disaster relief for past losses incurred. Given the geographical location and soil 
type of these farms, they cannot be regarded as a normal (i.e., average) risk.  
 Other indemnity.based insurances are to a lesser extent confronted with ad.
verse selection, like the aborted public.private crop insurance in Estonia (case 
3) and the Spanish winter cereal insurance (case 10). For the Spanish case, the 
diverse set of insured farmers in the pool (comprising, besides winter wheat, 
many other crops and livestock production) indicate that overrepresentation of 
risky prospects is of a lesser concern. 
 Adverse selection is also encountered in the multi.peril crop insurance (MPCI) 
programmes in the USA. Farmers know more about their farms and means of 
production than insurers do, are more likely to insure (Skees, Black, and Bar.
nett, 1997). Therefore, besides indemnity.based insurance schemes, also index.
based insurance are of interest in the current study. In this insurance scheme, 
the premiums and payouts are based on some kind of index (Halcrow, 1949). 
Payouts to a farmer are triggered if the actual outcome, in terms of measurable 
criterion, is below the certain limits of tolerance. Using an index reduces ad.
verse selection, since information regarding an index is more generally available 
and more reliable (Miranda, 1991). Because under the GRP, indemnities are 
based on county.level yields (case 12), farm.level information is not required and 
information asymmetries no longer apply (Skees, Black, Barnett, 1997). This 
also holds true for the revenue.based GRIP scheme (case 13), whereby revenue 
is defined as the product of county.level yields and the commodity price. More.
over, adverse selection is not relevant for the revenue insurance in Spain (case 
11) in which the guaranteed price levels are established with a price.index 
model. 
 
4.4.2 Moral hazard 
 
Coble (1995) reported that income stabilisation programmes (cases 1 and 2) 
would not be likely to distort farmer incentives to manage risk. Neither are de.
coupled direct payments under CAP (case 4) and disaster loans in Poland (case 
8) distortive. With stabilisation programmes, direct payments and loans farmers 
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still bear the full consequences of their actions, and therefore do not have a 
tendency to act less carefully than they otherwise would. 
 Moral hazard problems are relatively limited for the animal disease funds for 
notifiable diseases (cases 5 and 7). For example, a form of a deductible is ap.
plied in the Dutch variant since the death of animals is not compensated at all, 
while sick animals are only compensated at 50%. However, compensations are 
largely based on expert appraisal (not market value) which may lead to moral 
hazard behaviour (given the situation that reimbursement level exceeds actual 
market value). 
 Moral hazard problems are negligible or impossible in case of an index 
scheme (cases 11, 12, 13), whereby indemnification based on some objective 
and transparent index. It reduces moral hazard, because an individual farmer 
cannot influence the magnitude of the index (Miranda, 1991). For example under 
GRP (case 12) and GRIP (case 13) indemnities are based on county.level yields. 
Monitoring for moral hazard is unnecessary because the behaviour of an individ.
ual farmer is unlikely to affect county.level yields. It provides farmers incentives 
to manage risk to maximise farm production. Thus, the GRP coverage provides 
more incentives for effective risk management than an indemnity.based insur.
ance scheme (Baquet and Skees, 1994). This also holds true for the revenue 
insurance in Spain (case 11) in which the guaranteed price levels are estab.
lished with a price.index model. 
 Compensations based on loss appraisal may lead to moral hazard behaviour 
if indemnified losses are within the control of the farmer (cases 3, 6, 9, 10). 
These indemnity.based insurance schemes reduce incentives to farmers to 
manage risk because, if losses occur, they will be reimbursed by the insurer 
(Skees, 1993). However, it is a challenging task to prove whether there is evi.
dence of moral hazard under an insurance scheme. 
 Extensiveness of contract specifications and the level of deductibles reveal 
some information about moral hazard problems. A risk.sharing contract can in.
clude ‘rules of behaviour’. For sharecropping Stiglitz (1974) states that 'a con.
tract may also specify something about effort, degree of control, and amount of 
supervision'. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) state in a more general context that 
monitoring and verification are remedies against moral hazard. With deducti.
bles, insureds pay some specified amount of losses themselves, which reduces 
fraud and encourages loss prevention (Rejda, 1998). By using deductibles, the 
extent to which farmers can share risks is reduced. In this regard Arrow (1992) 
argues that, if without the use of such tools as deductibles there would be a 
complete absence of risk.shifting, it might be best to use the tools and have at 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Of the indemnity.based schemes under study, the Dutch rainfall mutual (case 
6) has by far the highest deductible (in table 4.3 the deductibles are provided). 
Moreover, a pre.specified severe rainfall event must have occurred for insureds 
to be eligible for compensation. Despite this double trigger system, moral haz.
ard is still present. It may be expected that, therefore, the level of distortion will 
be more severe for the other indemnity.based schemes.  
 
4.4.3 Rent seeking and capitalisation 
 
Rent seeking is a distortion because there is a misallocation of effort and re.
sources and because it tends to undermine the intended purposes of some pol.
icy measure. Some of the schemes under investigation are more vulnerable to 
rent seeking than others. This not only holds true for farmers, but in public.
private partnerships, subsidies create opportunities for rent.seeking behaviour 
also for crop insurance companies. Those who benefit from those rents, namely 
farmer.landowners and insurance companies, invest heavily in rent.seeking ac.
tivities designed to maintain or even expand access to these government.
generated rents. For example, Barnett et al. (2005) reports that when the USA 
federal crop insurance programme began to surcharge the premiums of those 
who collect indemnities most frequently, policymakers bowed to political pres.
sure from agricultural interest groups. Rent seeking may be encouraged by 
subsidies but can occur in other ways.  
 Almost all farm subsidies, such as CAP (case 4), tend to get capitalised into 
asset values (i.e., land and production rights). Given the other studied RMIs it is 
most dominant in substantial subsidised schemes with private (re.)insurers. 
Capitalisation of these subsidies bring no benefits to incoming farmers, so, in 
the long run, subsidies designed to improve farmers'incomes are self.defeating. 
Farmers are no better off than they would have been without them and society 
is worse off because resources are allocated in inefficient and undesirable 
ways. 
 Subsidised stabilisation accounts (cases 1 and 2) are vulnerable to rent 
seeking as they can be deducted from the participation levels. Two groups of 
participating farmers emerged after several years of the NISA programme hav.
ing been in operation. First, the majority of farmers maintained very low bal.
ances in their NISAs (Dismukes and Durst, 2006; Stokes et al., 2000). The goal 
of these farmers seemed to be to capitalise on the government matching sub.
sidy, so they tended to deposit the maximum balance on which they could re.
ceive a matching subsidy. These farmers withdrew funds whenever eligible, 
even in years of minor revenue shortfalls (Dismukes and Durst, 2006). Thus, 
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these farmers treated the government matching contributions as a form of sup.
plemental annual income (Ipsos Reid, 2001). The second group developed very 
large balances in their NISAs and was unlikely to withdraw funds in low revenue 
years (Dismukes and Durst, 2006). Instead, this group seemed to be capitalis.
ing on subsidised interest rates available with NISAs and treated NISA as a re.
tirement fund. 
 Subsidised premiums (cases 9, 10) and public reinsurance (case 6) are 
prone to these perverse incentives of rent seeking behaviour. The extent is 
more severe in the case of insurance schemes providing basic coverage 
against income drops than for those providing protection for natural disasters 
only. 
 If indemnities are based on an index (cases 11, 12, 13) that is objective, 
transparent, and easily accessible, opportunities for rent.seeking are greatly re.
duced. However, Paulson and Babcock (2007) report that in the USA, private in.
surers, not farmers or the government, are capturing many of the profits 
associated with GRIP (case 13). They demonstrate that a nationalised insurance 
programme, one that no longer offered subsidies to private.sector insurers, 
could provide an insurance product similar to that of the 1999.2003 GRIP prod.
uct with better coverage (98%) for comparable government support. 
 Other RMI under investigation, which are stabilisation funds, disease funds or 
disaster loans, which rely on governmental support are still vulnerable to rent 
seeking and capitalisation (cases 5, 7, 8). Only the pure private insurances are 
safeguarded from these impacts (case 5). 
 
4.4.4 Incentives for misreporting 
 
Another negative distortion which may be encountered in indemnity.based insur.
ance (cases 3, 6, 9, 10) is fraud. For example, some farmers may declare lar.
ger losses than they really incurred (Garrido et al., 2002). Fraudulent claims 
results in higher premiums to all insureds if not controlled adequately (Rejda, 
1998). With respect to the other RMIs fraud cannot be ruled out as long as one 
of the agents can benefit from it, but it is not as prevalent as in indemnity.based 
insurance schemes. 
 
4.4.5 Incentives for excessive risk exposure 
 
Governmental support to farmers may create perverse incentives such as 'ex.
cessive risk exposure' in the sense that if crop yields are subsidised, one can 
expect farmers to grow more of more risky crops in order to harvest more sub.
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sidy. Regarding this in a portfolio selection context, the uptake of any risk.
sharing instrument is likely to lead to changes in on.farm decisions. 
 Resent studies suggest that subsidised crop subsidies encourage produc.
tion in marginal, high.risk, areas (Wu, 1999). When this happens, subsidies 
cause losses to become self.perpetuating and society’s scarce resources to be 
misallocated (Barnett, 1999). 
 Although stabilisation funds (cases 1 and 2) rely on governmental support, 
this phenomenon does not manifest itself that profoundly. The existence of an 
income stabilisation fund (that works) is likely to stimulate farmers to adopt a 
more risky programme because some risks are covered. Indeed, that is the 
reason for having a stabilisation scheme . to induce farmers to operate closer 
to the point of maximising expected profit.  
 Also some of the other schemes under investigation are less vulnerable 
(cases 3, 5, 7,9) to excessive risk exposure than others. The latter cluster con.
tains RMIs with a limited premium differentiation (cases 6) or substantial gov.
ernmental support (cases 10,11,12,13). 
 As a result of GATT (General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade) negotiations, 
the CAP (4) was changed in 1992: intervention prices were stepwise reduced 
and the farmers received direct payments as part.compensation of the income 
losses induced by the policy alteration. In the course of this policy change, grain 
prices dropped by 35 to 40%. While income losses were only partly compen.
sated on average by the direct payments, these payments represent certain in.
come. Since they are independent of actual prices and yields they partly offset 
production risk. As a consequence, the volatility of income has been signifi.
cantly reduced due to the CAP reform. Model calculations for typical German 
arable farms that have shown the standard deviation of income dropped by 35 
to 40% from 1992 to 1996, as a result of the McSharry reform (Farwick 2006). 
Consequently, farmers have assumed more risk in other areas, for instance 
through specialisation in crops with higher average gross margins. The intro.
duction of direct payments reduces the willingness to pay for insurance by 25% 
under the assumption that only the fair premium is charged, and by 45% in the 
case of a 30% premium loading (Berg 2002a, 2002b). These results show that 
the present CAP significantly affects the risk exposure of farms and still creates 
an environment in which risk exposure is altered in an excessive way (causing 
welfare loss). For example, direct payments still encourage production in mar.
ginal, high.risk, areas. 
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4.4.6 Crowding out 
 
Governmental support crowds out the demand for private sector RMIs (Skees 
and Barnett, 1999). The extent depends both on the level of public support pro.
vided as well as on how it is directed. For example, drought disaster loans pro.
vided in Poland (case 8) have limited implications on private markets since a 
minor financial benefit could be achieved. 
 Private sector investments are not to be expected, given that a mandatory 
system such as the livestock funds would reimburse the direct losses of a noti.
fiable disease outbreak (cases 5 and 7).  
 Substantial public support in conjunction with a multi.peril coverage scheme 
crowds out private investment (cases 9,10,11). To a lesser extent, this holds 
true for government.assisted stabilisation accounts (cases 1 and 2) and a sin.
gle.peril mutual (case 6), whereas participation in private or mutual hail insur.
ance schemes is not affected in The Netherlands after launching  
 Skees, Black, and Barnett (1997) describe the idea of using GRP (case 12) 
as a component of a 'wrap around' approach. In their example, the government 
is heavily involved, perhaps the sole provider, of a GRP product sold to farmers. 
This product addresses the correlated risk problems of insuring agricultural 
yield and creates opportunities for private.sector insurers to introduce products 
that pay indemnities on individual farm losses. Thus, public.sector funds address 
the correlated risk and private sector funds address independent risk providing 
complementary, comprehensive coverage to farmers. 
 Prior to the 'McSharry' reform of CAP (case 4) price support was the pre.
dominant form of income support to farmers. Variable levies were charged on 
imports to protect domestic markets. In addition, market intervention took place 
as soon as domestic prices fell below the administrative (intervention) prices. In 
the case of exports, subsidies were paid that covered the difference between 
domestic and world market prices. The intervention price system (besides main.
taining a high price level) reduced downside risk. For the commodities covered 
by the CAP, price risk for farmers as well as for commodity merchants in 
Europe was therefore much lower than e.g. in the USA. As a consequence, 
other RMIs, such as futures markets, were largely crowded out. However, there 
was still a considerable volatility of farm gate prices (e.g. coefficients of varia.
tion of cereal prices revolved around 15%). The ongoing liberalisation of mar.
kets will inevitably lead to increased price volatility in the future. This and the 
prospect that the direct payments are likely to be decreased in the course of 
time (or at least linked to more rigid cross.compliance requirements) will even.
tually increase the farmers'needs and willingness to pay for additional RMIs. The 
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increased willingness to pay will then provide the basis to offer such instruments 
on a commercial basis.  
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5 Synthesis of theory and cases 
 
 
Government’s will to support 
There has been a long history and political will to support farmers. To achieve a 
fair standard of living for those involved in agriculture has been one of the key 
goals of the CAP. The initial instruments used to achieve this goal were rather 
distortive of international agricultural markets (price support, export subsidies 
etc.). Over the years the CAP has been reformed a couple of times to reduce 
the market distortions. One of the key elements is the change to decoupled 
payments which are supposed to have a smaller impact on the functioning of 
agricultural markets. Besides this price and income support there has also been 
a long tradition of ad.hoc relief measures to help remediate crises in agriculture. 
In most countries, farmers have been able to rely on governmental support in 
periods of crisis. The availability of such disaster relief has had a negative im.
pact on farmers'need for and willingness to apply some other risk management 
instruments such as commercial crop insurance. 
 In this study it was assumed that the will of the various governments to sup.
port the RMIs strongly depends on the political and socio.economic context in a 
certain country and on the resilience of the agricultural sector. The results show 
that this assumption cannot be confirmed by this study. It is more likely that the 
historical context (under which conditions an RMI is established and sometimes 
changed) can explain better the existence of the present RMIs in a country. It is 
also significant that in, practice, effective RMI for one or more participants 
(farmers, government or insurance companies) are difficult to change, even if 
they are not particularly efficient or lead to some distortions.  
 
Governmental support brings distortions 
The goal of many governments is to move away from ad.hoc support in case of 
crises towards other instruments such as various insurance products. The char.
acteristics of agricultural crises and lessons learned from the past make clear 
that private initiatives for risk sharing off.farm have been very limited and par.
ticipation levels have been low. On.farm strategies, such as diversification, is an 
effective way of coping with many of these risks. However, there is a trend in 
almost all countries for specialisation of agricultural farms, which increases the 
need for risk sharing off.farm. The cases show that government involvement has 
generally been necessary to achieve reasonably high farmer participation rates 
in such schemes. Farmers'enthusiasm for participation ís encouraged by sup.
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port from the public budget to the agricultural sector (and the insurance sector). 
WTO rules allow public support of agricultural insurance schemes. However, de.
pending on the nature of the RMIs used and the level of subsidies, such gov.
ernment participation also distorts markets. Moreover, it is likely to hinder the 
developments of private markets for RMIs while subsidising premiums could in.
crease the demand for instruments beyond the economic optimum. Some nega.
tive distortions of instruments such as rent seeking and capitalisation are, to a 
large extent, dependent on the extent of government support. 
 Designing RMIs and the extent of government support is, therefore, a deli.
cate issue, especially because reducing government involvement is very difficult 
when all stakeholders are satisfied with the situation. The cases show that there 
is no ideal RMI. The only exception is hail insurance which operates in many 
countries without government involvement, but this is because of the nature of 
the risk (uncorrelated, limited information asymmetry etc.). All other case stud.
ies show instruments with many negative distortions or instruments that are not 
effective at all.  
 
No clear relation between context and government involvement in RMIs 
The analysis of the 7 countries that formed part of this research did not lead to 
consistent relations between the six indicators for context and government in.
volvement. High economic importance, for example, does not necessarily lead 
to more involvement. Similar results were found for each indicator. Also, the re.
lation between continuous and ad.hoc support was explored in more detail. 
Whereas it can be expected that when continuous support is high, ad.hoc sup.
port would be low, the data did not demonstrate any consistent correlation sup.
porting this. Taking a closer look at the objectives and perceptions of different 
national governments, it can be seen that in some countries new insurance sys.
tems have been developed recently or are in the developing stage. Most of 
these systems are subsidised. Also, countries want to lower their ad.hoc pay.
ments, but the cases prove that this is difficult to achieve. The analysis of the 7 
countries that were part of this research did not lead to consistent relations be.
tween the six indicators for resilience, the need for RMIs (from a sector per.
spective) and government involvement.  
 
Price risks are of a different nature 
This report focuses on production risks (weather and notifiable animal diseases) 
and revenue/income risks. Price risks were traditionally covered by the CAP and 
these risks for current year productions can be offset by the agricultural sector 
itself, at least partly, with such instruments as future contracts, derivatives and 
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chain contracts or pooling of farmers'produce. They cannot protect farmers 
against longer run downturns in prices, which is the case with the CAP. Fur.
thermore, price risks show a more complicated relation with crises in agricul.
ture. On the one hand, prices can be a natural hedge for low yields, but on the 
other hand, price risks are often not the direct consequence of crises in agricul.
ture but of markets responding, generally retrospectively, to changes in produc.
tion and/or demand. 
 
Plant diseases almost not insurable 
In the EU there is a huge list of so.called Quarantine.organisms. Every year one 
or more of these organisms are detected in Dutch horticulture (Van Wenum, 
2008). Contrary to animal diseases where the direct losses are (partly) com.
pensated by EU and national government, this is not the case for plant dis.
eases. There are examples in the Netherlands of financial breakdown of firms 
because of the detection of such diseases. The consequences can, thus, be 
huge. There are also almost no private or public.private insurance systems to 
cope with the financial risks of the plant diseases. Only in the Netherlands some 
diseases in potatoes (Potato black ringspot virus and brown rot) can be insured 
(Potatopol). One of the main problems is that farmers are not willing to pay the 
premiums of the insurance because of underestimation of the risks. In other 
countries, participating in this research, no examples for coping with plant dis.
eases were found. Given the climate changes and the increasing trade in plant 
products world.wide the risks are increasing. On the other hand better quality 
systems and detection system can reduce the risk of introduction and spread of 
these diseases. The question is whether a better quality system (prevention, 
control) is enough to cope with plant diseases. Is an insurance system neces.
sary to cope with the financial risks remaining? And is public support necessary 
to seduce farmers into insuring themselves? Also, the option of a compulsory 
fund, such as animal disease funds described in this report, is possible. 
  
Addressing distortions 
Looking at weather risks, the main instruments used are described in the cases. 
They range from single crop to multi peril, and differ in the amount of govern.
ment support, coverage basis on (yield or revenue), and the damage appraisal 
(regional index or assessment of damage on an individual farm). As illustrated in 
this report, each of the instruments has its distortions. In designing a risk man.
agement instrument that distorts markets as little as possible, it is essential to 
address these distortions. Furthermore a choice is required how to weigh and 
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balance the different distortions. Table 5.1 provides a description of the differ.
ent distortions and how they can be addressed. 
 With respect to notifiable animal diseases, a large involvement by the gov.
ernment is mandated in the legislation. The main challenge with these instru.
ments is the reduction of moral hazard. For example, how to motivate farmers 
to do their utmost to prevent the outbreak or spread of contagious diseases.  
 
Table 5.1 Possible distortions and means to minimise them 
Possible distor.
tions 
Means to minimise distortions 
1. Adverse Selection a. mandatory insurance or levy system 
b. support after an event (e.g. drought loans) 
c. in case of a voluntary insurance; obligation for insureds to dis.
close all information about factors that may lead to extra risk, 
thereby allowing classification of insureds and differentiation of 
premiums 
d. for indemnity.based insurance schemes, index.based insurance 
(county.level yield, price.index model)  
2. Moral Hazard a. use of a deductible 
b. index.based insurance 
c. double trigger: severe event and a deductible 
d. Bonus.malus rebates and overcharge schemes 
3. Rent seeking a. commercial insurance (low or no public subsidy) 
b. indemnities based on an index that is objective, transparent and 
easy accessible. 
c. An active and statutorily stated participation of farmers, insur.
ance companies and public reinsurers. 
4. Misreporting Only relevant for indemnity.based insurance. Controlled by: moni.
toring, which is expensive or use of mutual insurance 
5. Excessive risk 
exposure  
Not relevant for stabilisation funds or disaster loans; 
For public or public private insurance systems: 
a. differentiation of premiums 
b. lower governmental or public support  
c. re.insurance, securitisation of risk, government stop.loss 
support 
6. Crowding out pri.
vate initiatives 
a. reduce level of governmental support 
b. limit governmental support to correlated risks leaving opportuni.
ties for private sector to insure individual farm losses. 
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 It can be argued that direct income support or income stabilisation schemes 
to help farmers cope with low income events are less distorting than subsidised 
farm insurance schemes because of the expected distortions of the latter. The 
Canadian schemes (NISA and CAIS) show that the distortions are low (relative to 
other RMIs) but that these schemes were not very effective for (groups of) 
farmers. In periods of crisis, ad.hoc assistance was still given to support the ag.
riculture sector. The described Spanish system with a public.private insurance 
scheme for a number of crops is reasonably effective from the perspective of 
farmers and government but does have moderate distortions in terms of rent 
seeking and crowding out privately offered instruments, less to adverse selec.
tion, moral hazard, and incentives for excessive risk exposure. Compared to the 
'good intervention practices' mentioned in section 2.3, it can be argued if the 
Spanish system only applies to catastrophic events, the support is surely not 
limited in scope and time.  
 
Defining a crisis or a catastrophe 
The definition of a crisis or a catastrophe is not uniform for the described 
cases. In article 69 of the EU health check an adverse climatic event is defined 
as an occurrence of a natural disaster such as frost, hail, ice, rain or drought 
that destroys more than 30% of the average of annual production of a given 
farmer calculated over the preceding three.year period or a three.year average 
based on the preceding five.year period, excluding the highest and lowest val.
ues. With climate changes, what would have been known as a crisis 10 years 
ago may become ‘normal'in the future. Clearly, different definitions may lead to 
different degrees of protection for farmers and perhaps significantly different 
calls on public funds. 
 
Efficiency should also be regarded 
A limitation of this study is that efficiency of the different systems was not part 
of the evaluation. Yet this is a critically important aspect in evaluating RMIs. 
While risk sharing may increase efficiency by allowing farmers to use their re.
sources more productively, as discussed earlier, subsidised RMIs can lead to 
large efficiency losses, especially if the level of subsidy is high. Distortions can 
lead farmers to change their farming systems in ways to 'farm' the subsidies 
rather than the land. For example, they may be prompted to grow more risky 
but less productive crops because, in that way, they get higher indemnity pay.
ments. Such inefficiencies have been noted, for example, with the USA crop in.
surance scheme (Skees, 1999b). To have measured such inefficiencies of the 
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various schemes considered in this report would have required an extensive and 










- Within the EU there are different RMI in use for production or yield risks. The 
schemes vary from private single peril insurance for hail, through to public.
private multi.peril insurance in Spain to ’emergency'assistance such as 
drought loans in Poland. In Estonia, the agriculture sector strongly relies on 
emergency support in periods of crisis. At this moment no commercial or 
government.subsidised insurance for adverse weather events is available in 
Estonia.  
- Within the EU there are no RMI in use to cope with price risks. There was 
some experience in Spain with the use of RMIs for potato and strawberry 
prices, but these programmes were not carried forward to renewed modes 
or approaches. Insurers have never been ready to underwrite market risks. 
- From the analysis, we can deduce that many instruments today exist not 
primarily because of the current political context, nor because of the current 
resilience of the sector. Rather, they are the product of the policies and sen.
timents of generations past. More specifically, the context at the time the in.
struments were designed and implemented. It seems to be far easier to 
introduce a new instrument supporting farmers than it is to take one away, 
which leads to a belief that these instruments are indeed primarily a product 
of the countries'historical circumstances and their learning process. 
- From an economic point of view, subsidising insurance is not effective as it 
disturbs markets. However in the real world a long history exists of subsid.
ing agriculture in different ways. This holds for the Western World (USA, 
Canada, EU). Reasons for this support differ in time and across countries 
and are not always triggered by crises. 
 
Role of the government 
- Within the EU the direct costs of notifiable diseases are indemnified by EU, 
national governments and in some countries (The Netherlands, Germany) 
also partly by farmers. The indirect costs such as production interruption 
can be commercially insured in some countries to a limited degree. In gen.
eral the participation by farmers in these insurances is low.  
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- The role and involvement of national governments differs for adverse 
weather events and for notifiable diseases.  
- For adverse weather events government participation varies from ad.
hoc relief in the case of crises to public.private insurance arrangements 
such as the subsidising of premiums and administrative costs.  
- For notifiable animal diseases, national governments have a role in pre.
vention and eradication. In addition, part or all of farmers'direct losses 
are indemnified by EU and national governments. 
- However we do see some trends among all countries that certainly seem to 
supersede any contextual differences between countries. While all countries 
have repeatedly expressed a desire to move away from a system of ad.hoc 
support as needed (due to its unpredictability and cost), the overriding trend 
is that support in the form of agricultural subsidies is still desirable. In the 
EU, this may be partially due to the process under the Common Agricultural 
Policy, whereas in the United States this appears to be a largely political 
process. Also important in this respect are the international agreements at 
the WTO level. But there is an undeniable tendency towards a (continued) 
publicly supported agricultural sector  
 
Efficacy of RMIs 
- The efficacy of non.subsidised private insurance instruments is, in general, 
low for farmers and government, mainly because of the low participation of 
farmers (hail and thunderstorms being an exception). In periods of crisis, 
governments often have to support the agricultural sector. Even with the 
highly subsidised public.private insurance schemes in the USA and Canada, 
political imperatives mean that the governments still spend substantial 
amounts on disaster relief for agriculture.  
- The Spanish public.private system of multi.peril insurance is effective for 
farmers and national government but is potentially distorting, and crowds 
out other privately developed schemes. Most deficiencies encountered in 
publicly provided crop insurance have been successfully fought since the 
mid.1990s. However, premium subsidisation is high in percentage terms. 
- From the point of view of social welfare, none of the schemes reviewed can 
be said to be ‘optimal’. No public policy is optimal. It is clear that subsidising 
heavily is suboptimal from a social welfare (i.e. efficiency) point of view. 
Subsidising insurance systems is distortive due to the change in demand 
and supply for insurance services. Subsidising insurance results in an in.
creased demand from farmers. If the commercial rates for crop insurances 
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are perceived as being too expensive by farmers it is questionable whether 
insurance is the proper risk management instrument.  
- From the analysis of distortions, some arrangements are likely to be more 
socially efficient than others. 
- The Canadian income systems (NISA and CAIS) are not effective. These sys.





- The choice for any new system (or the revision of an existing one) is a politi.
cal decision where efficacy, efficiency and distortions (see also table 5.1) 
must be weighed up. If subsidies are involved, special attention should be 
given to limiting the potential efficiency losses due to negative distortions 
- Government should focus on the correlated risks and should offer opportuni.
ties for private sector insurers to introduce products that pay indemnities on 
individual farm losses (almost uncorrelated losses). 
- An interesting addition to this study would be to evaluate the third major 
stakeholder in risk management: the insurance companies. This was not 
part of the scope of this study, yet getting them involved in this may offer 
new opportunities and insights. Questions such as: 'What would move the in.
surance companies to offer certain types of insurance?' could be very helpful 
in determining the most appropriate policy when the need for RMIs by the 
sector is also taken into account. Actuaries at the major insurers have a 
keen eye for the existing markets, and are able to help determine where the 
greater chances are. 
- In practice RMI are more successful (better participation) if they are subsi.
dised. Furthermore, there is an increasing trend in the willingness of gov.
ernments to support RMIs. So not only efficiency reasons, but more political 
reasons are the basics of these decisions. If subsidised RMI are developed, 
the focus should be on minimising the distortions.  However, the risks of 
large, extensive crises are not insured. It is even the question whether insur.
ance companies can insure them. From this, it can be concluded that the 
agricultural sector needs a last resort. The government should acknowledge 
and anticipate that. 
- The case studies suggest that ad.hoc support of national governments will 
remain important in times of crises. To the Dutch government, the recom.
mendation can be made to incorporate ad.hoc relief in its policies, for ex.
ample by the reservation of financial resources. Furthermore, if the Dutch 
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government wishes to support farmers suffering from a crisis by means of 
an institutional ad.hoc relief instrument, this could be conditional upon the 
farmer's participation in a given private or public.private insurance scheme. 
This reduces the risk of adverse selection. 
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This subject index is not a list of scientific definitions of the subjects. The goal is 
to explain the meaning of these subjects as used in this research.  
 
1. Adverse selection 
Anti.selection, or negative selection is a term used in economics, insurance, 
statistics, and risk management. On the most abstract level, it refers to a mar.
ket process in which 'bad' results occur due to information asymmetries be.
tween buyers and sellers: the 'bad' products or customers are more likely to be 
selected. A bank that sets one price for all its current account customers runs 
the risk of being adversely selected against by its high.balance, low.activity (and 
hence most profitable) customers. Two ways to model adverse selection are 
with signalling games and screening games. 
 
2. Agency problems 
In political science and economics, the principal.agent problem or agency di.
lemma treats the difficulties that arise under conditions of incomplete and 
asymmetric information when a principal hires an agent. 
 
3.  Asymmetric information 
In economics and contract theory, an information asymmetry (or state of 
asymmetric information) is present when one party to a transaction has more or 
better information than the other party. Most commonly, information asymme.
tries are studied in the context of principal.agent problems. Information asym.
metry deals with the study of decisions in transactions where one party has 
more or better information than the other. This creates an imbalance of power 
in transactions which can sometimes cause the transactions to go awry. 
 
4. Chain contracts 
Chain contracts are legal contracts between members in the food chain where 
parts of the transaction are regulated for a longer period (more than one trans.
action). Parts of the transaction are quantity, quality, mean price, price reduc.
tion, time of delivery. In practice there is a huge variation among chain 
contracts. By chain contracts parts of the price risks can be decreased.  
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5. Crop insurance 
A contract of indemnity by which, for a specified premium, one party promises 
to compensate another for the financial loss incurred by the destruction of agri.




In economics, crowding out theoretically occurs when the government expands 
its borrowing to finance increased expenditure, or cuts taxes (i.e. is engaged in 
deficit spending), crowding out private sector investment by way of higher inter.
est rates. Also in the area of risk insurance a governmental subsidy crowds out 
other private initiatives to insure the same risk. 
 
7. Derivatives 
Derivatives are financial instruments whose value changes in response to the 
changes in underlying variables. The main types of derivatives are futures, for.
wards, options and swaps. 
 
8. Distortion 
A distortion is the alteration of the original shape (or other characteristic) of an 
object, image, sound, waveform or other form of information or representation. 
Distortion is usually unwanted. In this report a distortion is defined as the nega.
tive side.effects of a certain RMI. 
 
9. Efficacy 
Efficacy is the ability to produce a desired amount of the desired effect or suc.
cess in achieving a given goal, in the current study efficacy is used in a qualita.
tive and quantitative way. 
 
10. Equity 
Equity capital is defined as the amount of capital provided by the company's 
owner(s). This differs from debt capital which requires business owners to pay 
interest and principal payments to the debt financier at set intervals. Providing 
new equity (an 'issuance' of new equity) gives the firm new capital and increases 
owners' equity by the same amount and time needed. An issuance of new 
shares, to raise new capital, increases shareholders' equity. Formally, owners' 
equity is also a form of liability, but is deemed separate and different from other 
liabilities since it is a residual interest, ranked last in the series; equity is gener.
ally considered to be an asset. 
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11. Excessive risk exposure 
Excessive risk exposure means that an policyholder takes more risks because 
(s)he is insured. Examples are crop production in areas with low rainfall.  
 
12. Future contracts 
A futures contract is a standardised contract, traded on a futures exchange, to 
buy or sell a certain underlying instrument at a certain date in the future, at a 
specified price. 
 
13. Hail insurance 
Coverage against hail damage to crops. Coverage is on a proportionate basis; 
that is, in the event of loss, a farmer will recover an amount based on the ratio 
of the damaged part of a crop to the entire crop. 
 
14. In.between risks 
In.between risks are risks which are neither fully uncorrelated (like hail and thun.
derstorms) nor fully correlated like market prices. Examples of in.between risks 
in agriculture are floods, excessive rainfall. 
 
15. Livestock insurance 
Coverage for designated horses and other farm animals if they are damaged or 
destroyed. The insurance includes registered cattle and herds, other farm live.
stock, and zoo animals. This type of insurance protects the farmer or rancher 
against the premature death of animals resulting from natural causes, fire, light.
ning, accidents, and acts of God, acts of individuals other than the owner or 
employees, and destruction for humane purposes. 
 
16. Loss Ratio 
Ratio of losses (indemnity paid) to earned premiums 
 
17. Misreporting 
Misreporting is a kind of fraud used by some insurers to get more indemnity 
from the insurers. 
 
18. Moral Hazard 
Moral hazard is the prospect that a party insulated from risk may behave differ.
ently from the way it would behave if it were fully exposed to the risk. Moral 
hazard arises because an individual or institution does not bear the full conse.
quences of its actions, and therefore has a tendency to act less carefully than it 
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otherwise would, leaving another party to bear some responsibility for the con.
sequences of those actions. For example, an individual with insurance against 
automobile theft may be less vigilant about locking his car, because the nega.
tive consequences of automobile theft are (partially) borne by the insurance 
company. 
 
19. Multiple.peril insurance 
Policy that incorporates several different types of property insurance coverage, 
such as flood, fire, wind, etc. In its broadest application, the term is synony.
mous with all.risks insurance, which covers loss or damage to property from 
fortuitous circumstances not specifically excluded from coverage. 
 
20. Notifiable animal diseases 
Notifiable disease is any disease that is required by law to be reported to gov.
ernment authorities. This collation of information allows the authorities to moni.
tor the disease, and provides early warning of possible outbreaks. Many 
governments have enacted regulations for reporting of both human and animal 
(generally livestock) diseases. 
 
21. Pooling of risks 
A risk pool is a method used by insurance companies to reduce their exposure 
to sudden and severe losses caused by large.scale catastrophic events. 
 
22. Private initiatives 
Private initiatives are initiatives fully organised by the market (without govern.
mental interference and without subsidies). 
 
23. Rent seeking and capitalisation 
Rent seeking occurs when an individual, organisation or firm seeks to make 
money by manipulating the economic and/or legal environment rather than by 
trade and production of wealth. Rent seeking generally implies the extraction of 
uncompensated value from others without making any contribution to 
productivity, such as by gaining control of land and other pre.existing natural re.
sources, or by imposing burdensome regulations or other government decisions 
that may affect consumers or businesses. While there may be few people in 
modern industrialised countries who do not gain something, directly or indi.
rectly, through some form or another of rent seeking, rent seeking in the ag.




Resilience is to the capacity to endure stress and bounce back, the capacity 
that may be available to given farms at some times and not others, under some 
threats not others. Survivability is the quantified ability of a system, subsystem, 
equipment, process, or procedure to continue to function during and after a 
natural or man.made disturbance; 
 
25. Revenue insuranc 
A contract of indemnity by which, for a specified premium, one party promises 
to compensate another for the financial loss incurred by the destruction of agri.
cultural products from the forces of nature, such as rain, hail, frost, or insect in.
festation and or by low prices. 
 
26. Socially efficient 
Efficiency regarded from a society. RMIs are defined as socially efficient if it 
makes at least one individual better off, without making any other individual 
worse off. 
 
27. Systemic risks 
Systemic risk is a specific term used in finance, it means the market risk or the 
risk that cannot be diversified away, as opposed to 'idiosyncratic risk', which is 
specific to individual stocks. It refers to the movements of the whole economy. 
Even if we have a perfectly diversified portfolio there is some risk that we can.
not avoid and this is the systemic risk. However, the systemic risk is not the 
same for all securities or portfolios. Different companies respond differently to a 
recession or a booming economy. For example, think of the automobile industry 
compared to the food industry in case of a recession. Both of them will be af.
fected negatively but food industry not as much as automobile industry. 
In insurance it is difficult to obtain financial protection against 'systemic risks' 
because of the inability of any counter.party to accept the risk. For example it is 
difficult to obtain insurance for life or property in the event of nuclear war. The 
essence of systemic risk is therefore the correlation of losses. 
 
28. Transaction costs 
A transaction cost is a cost incurred in making an economic exchange. For ex.
ample, most people, when buying or selling a stock, must pay a commission to 
their broker; that commission is a transaction cost of doing the stock deal. 
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29. Weather insurance 
Business interruption insurance in which the insured is indemnified for loss of 
earnings and payment of expenses resulting from adverse weather conditions. 
For example, if a fair, horse race, or boxing match is rained off, this can cause 
a substantial loss of money for a promoter who may have spent huge sums in 
advance of the event for rental, advertising, and site conditioning. However, the 
policy does not cover damage to property because of rain. 
 
30. Yield insurance 
A contract of indemnity by which, for a specified premium, one party promises 
to compensate another for the physical loss incurred by the destruction of agri.
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